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The Right to Stay Alive?
Madeleine Blot
Food and Drug Law
1Recently, a close friend died of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known
as Lou Gehrig's disease. He was an otherwise healthy lawyer in his sixties who
looked forward to retiring, after a long career of practicing law in New York, to
spend time with his family and new grandson. Harry planned to retire during
September of last year. He died on September 2nd
Harry was diagnosed with ALS in January of 1997. Although we were all
aware that there is no known cure for the disease, we were told that it doesn't
usually take its toll until three to ve years after diagnosis. Harry exhibited no
observable symptoms of the disease for the rst several months of his illness.
Combined with the fact that ALS was a disease which I had barely even heard
of, this made it dicult for me to absorb the fact that Harry was really sick. By
the summer, however, Harry had begun noticeably to deteriorate. And once the
deterioration began, it moved at a pace more rapid than anyone could believe.
It soon became necessary for Harry to use a cane to walk, and, within weeks of
that, he was in a wheelchair. His voice was soon aected by the deterioration of
his muscles, and the medication he was being treated with made him so drowsy
and lethargic that it severely decreased his quality of life. Despite all of this,
Harry came into work every day, sat at his desk, saw clients, and continued
conducting business as usual | or as best he could - until practically the day
he died.
2There are currently twenty-ve to thirty thousand Americans who suer from
ALS.1 Compared to the millions of Americans who suer from more well-known
diseases such as cancer and AIDS, however, the numbers seem almost insignif-
icant. ALS is an uncommon disease, which few people have heard of and even
fewer understand. But to the person diagnosed with the illness and to his family and
friends, the disease is quite real and equally unrelenting. While Harry was still
alive, I learned a lot about ALS. I often talked with him about his condition and
tried from whatever source possible to gather information for him. Harry was sched-
uled to participate in a experimental study for a new drug intended to slow the
process of ALS. The FDA canceled this experimental program several weeks
before Harry died.
Although I was not too familiar with the workings of the Food and Drug
Administration, I, as many, had always heard stories about the red|tape asso-
ciated with its drug review and approval process. I had heard about the cancer,
and more recently the AIDS, lobbies that demanded a quicker and less controlled
review process for new, potentially life-saving, drugs. I had heard the outrage
expressed by terminally-ill patients and their families from whom access to new
drugs had been delayed and, in some instances, ultimately denied. It wasn't
until last summer, however, that I experienced the eects of the process rst|
hand.
The idea that terminally-ill individuals should be allowed special access to
unapproved drugs is by no means a new concept. Nor is the technique of per-
sonalizing the FDA's review process with an example of how a close friend or
family member paid for the lengthy and cumbersome process with his or her
life. Although my purpose in this paper is to evaluate the question of whether
2
3terminally-ill patients should have the right of access to whatever potentially life-
saving drugs they choose, I did not begin this paper with my story about Harry as a
technique designed to illustrate the callousness of the Food & Drug Administration.
Although the eects of its new drug review process certainly appear harsh to people
whom it has hurt, I would nd it hard to believe that the FDA is trying to harm
anyone.
On the contrary, I believe that an objective evaluation would probably show that -
given the extensive number of decisions over which it has jurisdiction and the limited
time and resources it has at its disposal - the agency is doing its best to be as fair, but
also as careful, as it can. Because of its function, the FDA inevitably has forces
pulling at it from many dierent directions, among which it is forced to prioritize.
Equally, it is endowed with the very important duty of protecting human life, a
job which must be taken seriously at all costs and which, if pursued negligently,
could have serious consequences for the agency itself. Thus, although the length and
detail of its review process do in fact produce some unnecessary suering and even
deaths, it would be naive to disregard all the suering which the process eliminates
and the lives which it saves. In its defense, FDA could point to all the harmful drugs
that would have reached the market and harmed or even killed people, had its review
standards been laxer. These are the stories that tend to go unpublicized.
Although some terminally|ill patients will try literally anything at the point where
their situations have become desperately hopeless, most of the shocking stories of the
FDA's callousness involve instances in which a drug, which was eventually determined
to be safe and eective, was delayed from entering the market as a
3
4result of the agency's approval process. The common criticism is that, had FDA acted
quicker, many lives could have been saved.
What we have to remember in criticizing the FDA for these mistakes, however,
is that our criticism is made with hindsight rather than foresight. We make our
reproaches about instances such as this with the retrospective knowledge that a given
drug turned out to be safe and eective. The only reason we know this, however, is
because FDA took the time to determine it. If the same drug had instead turned out
not to be safe and/or eective, would we have lauded FDA for rushing it into the
market so that human beings could be used as guinea pigs to determine the answer?
The point is that, given its function, duties, and liabilities, there is not much that the
FDA can do dierently in the area of improving access to even potentially life|saving
drugs.
This harsh fact does not change the other fact, however, that there are still
terminally|ill people out there living under excruciating and unbearable circum-
stances and dying perhaps needlessly, who, but for the length of the FDA's review
process, might be cured, or at least successfully treated. Equally, it does not diuse
the anger and outrage of family members and friends who have lost someone close
to them who might have been saved. So what do we do? I stated above that my
goal in this paper is not to denounce the FDA or to suggest methods by which the
agency's processes could be improved. The story of the battle between terminally|ill
individuals and the FDA is one that has been told time and time again. Instead, my
aim is to analyse and evaluate the issue of whether terminally-ill individuals should
be given access to unapproved drugs from a dierent perspective, e.g. not as a battle
at all.
4
5Rather than weighing the duties of the FDA against the corresponding rights of
terminally-ill patients, I would like to abstract the latter issue from the administrative
context in which it usually arises and evaluate it as a discrete and separate matter.
Thus, my plan is to evaluate the question of whether terminally-ill individuals have a
fundamental right, independent of rules and procedures laid down by the legislature or
its agencies, to have unqualied access to drugs which they believe could potentially
save or prolong their lives. In this context, I will analyse the pros and cons of allowing
terminally-ill individuals the choice of whether to take unapproved drugs as a mat-
ter in and of itself, without regard to the administrative complications that currently
surround it.
While standing by my belief that FDA can't help infringing on the right of terminally-
ill individuals, I will argue that the matter should be removed from FDA's jurisdiction
altogether, and evaluated in a constitutional setting where it more properly be-
longs. Before I move on to a discussion of why I believe that the question of whether
the terminally-ill should have access to unapproved but potentially life-saving drugs
2 should be dealt with as a constitutional matter, I will briey discuss why I believe
that it should not be dealt with by the FDA.
FDA Is Not the Proper Forum For Evaluation of Fundamental Rights
Clearly, the FDA was established precisely to deal with issues concerning the
human body, for which reason its members include skilled scientists from all dierent
elds and for which reason it often consults with advisory committees comprised of
doctors whose input might be relevant. The categories of food and drugs |over
precisely which it is given jurisdiction | possess extensions,
5
6however, which are vastly far|reaching. For this reason, decisions that touch nn these
categories call fcr all dierent types of questions and considerations to be addressed,
from the most mundane to the most philosophical. To some extent, this should be
acceptable.
Although the task of deciding which color additives should be allowed in cosmetics
implicates questions of a dierent type and degree of importance than the question
of whether a new medical device is safe to be used in human surgery, there is no
obvious reason why FDA is not as equipped as anyone else to perform the appropriate
benet/risk calculations for each question and even answer the ethical issues which
each demands to be answered. After all, wouldn't lay people be better advised, in
deciding what foods and drugs to put into their bodies, to defer to the judgment of an
agency whose members are equipped with medical and scientic knowledge that they
do not even begin to possess. Is a bit of paternalism such a bad thing when it comes
to matters involving our health? The prudent answer would probably be no.
There are certain properly labeled food and drug issues, however, whose seriousness
and urgency is of such great magnitude that a decision to bring them under FDA's
jurisdiction leaves the realm of prudence and enters that of the absurd. It is simply
inappropriate to force certain types of issues to be evaluated by an agency
which, despite how it internally prioritizes, must spend at least some of its time
deciding what color lipsticks we can use. Although the question of where to draw a
given line is never one that can be answered by an a priori analysis, my argument
is that an appropriate place to draw the line that separates those issues which
might not be considered appropriately left up to the discretion of
6
7FDA from those which may be, might be around issues which involve intimate and
literally life|and|death decisions.
To be clear, I am not arguing that governmental paternalism is per se a bad
thing whenever it touches on an individual's freedom of choice; or even when the
choice in question is a personal one that regards an individual's own body. I am
stopping short of even reaching that issue. Instead, I am arguing that there should be
recognized a special class of rights - which we might call the rights of the terminally|
ill - that should be subject to independent rules and standards and evaluated on
its own terms. Thus, implicit in my argument is the view that the terminally|ill
comprise a special class deserving to be subject to dierent standards than the rest
of us in matters regarding which the fact of their terminal illness forces them to face
dierent questions than the rest of us do. Medical and health issues concerning the
terminally-ill involve urgent, sometimes on-the-spot decisions, always of life|and|
death proportions. More importantly, the terminally-ill often face more limited
choices than the rest of us do because, as a result of their circumstances, many
choices have already been taken away from them. Though death is certain for all of
us, for individuals diagnosed with a terminal condition, it is imminent.
In his concurrence in a recent Supreme Court case regarding physician|assisted
suicide, Justice Stevens made the point that the question facing terminal individu-
als who seek assistance in ending their lives is not whether to die but instead how
to die, Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302, at 2307 (Stevens concurring) . This statement can
be easily analogized to the situation at hand, regarding terminally|ill patients who
seek to take unapproved drugs.
7
8The question for them is not whether to stay alive but how to stay alive. I plan to
save the philosophical analysis of the question of whether terminally-ill individuals
should be allowed special access to drugs and medication until later in the paper. My
reason for bringing up the analogy between my topic and physician-assisted suicide
here, however, is not incidental.
Clearly, there are very strong conceptual links between the right asserted by
terminally-ill individuals to have their doctors assist them in ending their lives prema-
turely and the right asserted by terminally-ill patients to have the choice of whether to
take potentially life-saving, but unapproved, drugs. Both are based ultimately on the
philosophical values of personal autonomy and freedom of choice. Both relate to ex-
cruciatingly personal issues. Both involve life-and-death decisions. And both fall very
clearly under the extension of rights involving the terminally-ill, an essential feature
which I believe binds them together more appropriately than any other feature which
might place them in the extension of a dierent category.
Where these issues diverge, however, is with respect to the context in which they
arise. Unlike the issue of whether terminally-ill patients should have special access to
medications, the issue of physician|assisted suicide has been formulated, anal-
ysed and evaluated as a positive constitutional right. The question of whether the
terminally|ill should have access to unapproved drugs, however, has been answered
merely as a consequence of administrative decisions covering a variety of unrelated
issues. The issue of physician|assisted suicide has been brought before the Supreme
Court, twice recently, in response to state laws which prohibited it, as a matter of
constitutional concern. On the other hand, although cancer and AIDS lobbies have
been ghting for years
S
9to induce FDA to modify its procedures in order to provide victims of the diseases
greater access to unapproved drugs, their cause has never been presented and ruled
on as a constitutional matter.
Indeed, the closest the Supreme Court ever came to evaluating the right of the
terminally-ill to have access to unapproved drugs as a constitutional matter was in the
1979 case of United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) . The case involved a
plea on the part of terminally|ill cancer patients to enjoin the FDA from banning
their use of a drug called laetrile, derived from the kernels of seeds of most fruits,
Rutherford, at 549, which purported to be a cure for cancer.
Although there was some mention of constitutional rights in the opinions of Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the latter ultimately and exclusively decided the
issue as a matter of statutory interpretation and administrative law. Brushing aside
any hint of constitutional concern, the Court accepted FDA's conclusion that Laetrile
was not under any theory exempt from the requirement of section 505 of the Federal,
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. sec. 301 et seq. (FD&C Act), which pro-
vides that a new drug be proven safe and eective before it can be shipped in interstate
commerce. To justify its acceptance of this conclusion, the Court points out that the
construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to sub-
stantial deference, Rutherford at 553. Reasoning of this type resounds throughout the
Court's entire opinion, as it dismisses the suggestion that the terminally-ill comprise
a special class on the basis that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act makes no
special provision for drugs used to treat them. That conclusion, the Court holds, is
clear from the plain language of the statute. The Court concludes that the question
of whether the terminally-ill should as
9
10a class be exempted from the reach of certain provisions in the
statute is one that must be decided as a matter of legislative
judgment and not as a matter of judicial inference, Rutherford at
558
However, rather than analysing the question of whether the terminally-ill should
be exempt from certain provisions of the FD&C Act, the Court begs the question.
It concludes that special exceptions should not be made for the terminally|ill by
the circular reasoning that, as the statute reads, no exceptions are made. Thus, the
Laetrile Court's holding that the terminally|ill do not comprise a special class cannot
be taken to mean anything more than that the terminally|ill do not comprise a special
class, entitled to exemption from the reach of the FD&C Act. For, this is the only
question that the Laetrile Court was dealing with. Rather than evaluating whether
the terminally-ill should be recognized as a class worthy of constitutional protection,
they determined simply that the language of the FD&C Act neither explicitly nor
implicitly exempted them from its reach. Rather than deciding whether denying them
access to a potentially life-saving drug was in conict with their constitutional rights,
the Court determined that FDA's decision to ban the drug was not in conict with its
statute.
The Laetrile case may reasonably be construed as providing a negative answer to
the question of whether terminally-ill
individuals have the right to have access to unapproved drugs.4 My question how-
ever is whether the answer would have been the same if the questions had been phrased
dierently, so that the language of the constitution, and not that of the FD&C Act,
would be the relevant guide to Court's analysis of the issue. It may be true, as the
Court points out, that 'Mwjhen construing a statute so explicit
10
11in scope, a court must act within certain well|dened constrairr&', namely those
imposed by the legislative purpose of the statute Rutherford at 551. It is also true,
however, that positive laws cannot unreasonably constrain constitutional rights and
that the Court has not only a right but a duty to set these priorities straight.
One might ask then, what is this right I am alluding to and on what do I ground
my belief that the Supreme Court would be willing to recognize it? This is where
the issue of physician-assisted suicide comes in so handy. One might argue that the
Laetrile Court's seeming obliviousness to the constitutional implications of its statu-
tory decision was strategically deliberate rather than misguided; that its choice to
resolve the issue on purely statutory grounds stemmed from a reluctance on its part
to disturb a longstanding administrative policy involving issues of considerable public
controversy Rutherford at 554.
As I noted above, the Laetrile case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1979.
Since then, however, the intensity of the 'public controversy' surrounding issues that
implicate the rights of the terminally-ill has become much more pronounced and
volatile, particular in the direction of favoring these rights. Since then,
we have had both the Cruzan case , which unqualiedly granted the terminally|
ill the right to refuse or be withdrawn from life| support, and the incessant pleas on
the part of the terminally|ill themselves and a large segment of society that the right
of the terminally-ill to end their lives with dignity be constitutionally recognized as
well.
I am not saying that, were terminally|ill individuals to assert their right to unap-
proved drugs on constitutional grounds tomorrow, it is anything near clear that they
would prevail.
11
12Indeed, that is precisely the question which I intend to explore throughout the re-
mainder of this paper. What I believe, however, is that the Laetrile case should by no
means preclude this outcome; and that the current trend involving the rights of the
terminally-ill is denitely moving in the direction of liberality.
As I nd that there are strong analogical and conceptual links between what is
known as the right to die and the right at stake for terminally-ill individuals who
seek access to unapproved drugs, I believe that it will be enlightening to use the
Supreme Court's recent discussion of the constitutionality of the former right to guide
my analysis of the latter. As the two share a philosophical basis of justication,
arguments raised for and against one will often be analogous to arguments made in
favor of and against the other. Accordingly, for the purposes of analogy, I will call the
right at stake in my topic the right to stay alive
I will begin by giving a brief description of the current legal status of both physician|
assisted suicide and of the right to refuse or be withdrawn from life-support, both of
which involve what is commonly referred to as the right to die. After this, I will
discuss the current legal status of the right to stay alive. I will then discuss the rela-
tionship between these rights from several dierent perspectives, using the discussions
laid out in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding the right to die to guide my eval-
uation of the right to stay alive. I will reserve my conclusion as to whether and/or
to what extent the right to stay alive should be constitutionally recognized until after
I have completed my analysis. At that point, I will revisit the question of whether
it would benet the terminally-ill in a practical sense to challenge their right to stay
alive on constitutional grounds, rather than pursuing their current course of action
and attempting simply to
12
13reform FDA procedures. For now, however, my premise is that the merits of tne
right of the terminally|ill to stay alive 6 should be evaluated on ethical and
philosophical grounds, free of theoretically irrelevant administrative concerns. It is
precisely this type of analysis which I will set out to do in the remainder of this paper.
Current Legal Status of the Right to Die
As mentioned above, the right to die has most recently been spoken of in
the context of the debate over physician-assisted suicide. The right is asserted by
and/or on behalf of terminally| ill individuals who urge that doctors be legally
sanctioned to assist them (by supplying them with lethal medication) in ending
their lives at the point where physical suering and unbearable pain has made
their lives intolerable. As asserted by respondents |four doctors and three
terminally-ill patients - in the recent Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 U.S. 2258 (1997) the right would be very specic and contained. It would not be
interpretable to allow euthanasia, nor would it be recognized in individuals who were
simply discouraged with their physical conditions. Instead, it would arise only
in the most extreme and hopeless cases, where patients have been conclusively
diagnosed as suering from terminal conditions and where the pain which these
illnesses cause is unbearable.
Despite the narrowness of the right which respondents in Glucksberg were
seeking, the Glucksberg Court handed down a decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of the challenged Washington state statute which expressly prohibited
physician-assisted suicide. The argument in Glucksberg rested on substantive due
process grounds.
13
14In the companion case, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997) however, the Court
upheld an identical New York state statute. The Quill petitioners challenged New
York State's prohibition of physician-assisted suicide on equal protection grounds.
While the Glucksberg and Quill decisions clearly granted state legislatures the
option of prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, it is important to keep in mind that
the Court does not rule out the possibility that a state may legally decide to adopt
this option. Although the decisions in both cases were unanimous, there were ve
concurring opinions (which were identical for the two cases), which seemed to want to
leave open the possibility for change in this area. Recognizing the current volatility of
this topic, even the majority ended its opinion by encouraging further debate on the
issue at the state level. As of right now, however, only the state of Oregon has passed
a statute allowing physician|assisted suicide.
Although physician-assisted suicide is still illegal in most states, the 1990 Cruzan
decision not only recognized but constitutionally mandated another, supposedly more
innocuous, right to die. This is the right to refuse life-sustaining measures or be
withdrawn from life-support. First recognized in the case of Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), this right was
popularized in the earlier New Jersey Supreme Court case of Karen Ann Quinlan,
In Re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10 (1976)
The intuition underlying the right to refuse or be withdrawn from life-support is
that human beings should have the option of being able to die a natural death,
unimpeded by articial life| sustaining devices and techniques. The right may
arise under several sets of circumstances and may be implemented by several
dierent methods. On the one hand, the right may eectively prohibit doctors from
using on-the-spot medical life|saving
14
15techniques, such as administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Equally, it may
authorize a doctor to refrain from putting a patient on life-support or to withdraw a
patient from life-support who has been determined to be in a persistent vegetative
state or diagnosed as suering from an incurable and irreversible
7
condition
The right enunciated in Cruzan does not imply a default rule
of death where individuals would otherwise be kept alive by 'articial tech-
niques', but instead is wholly intention-based. An individual may evidence his
desire not to be kept alive articially by several methods. At any time, a patient
may execute a living will, instructing any doctors who might be responsible for his
treatment to refrain from all or any 'articial' life|saving techniques. Living
wills are probably the most eective means of conveying this intention because
they provide written documentation of the individual's intention, which may be
taken to imply that they are the product are reective and competent analysis and
consideration. This is particularly true in cases where a living will is executed while an
individual is still healthy. Thus, living wills written in advance of illness or mental
deterioration are probably taken as the truest and most reliable expressions of
an individual's intent.
Despite the fact that a living will counts as written evidence of intention,
an individual may verbally invalidate a living will at any time. Because of the
strong disinclination on the part of doctors and society to opt against the use
of life|saving techniques, a verbal invalidation of a living will expressing the desire
not to be kept alive articially will be honored. It is not as clear, however, whether
a verbally-expressed intention not to be
15
16kept alive artifially will override a living will which provides in whole or in part to
the contrary. In fact, even in the absence of any written documentation, a verbal
expression of the desire not to be kept alive articially will not be the nal word.
Much scrutiny will be given to the competency of the individual making this
statement, especially if he is already suering from disease or illness.
Even more dicult, however, are cases in which a patient is unconscious or in a
coma and his intention regarding the issue has not been documented. Some courts
have allowed clear and convincing evidence of a patient's desire not to be kept alive
articially to
override the presumption of life that otherwise prevails.9 This situation may arise
where a patient who has otherwise always been competent and healthy becomes
the victim of an accident or is struck with a quick and debilitating illness. If
enough family members and friends attest to earlier statements made by the
individual expressing a strong desire on his or her part not to be kept alive
articially, courts will sometimes honor this intention.10 Though the right to be
withdrawn from life-support is unqualiedly recognized in competent individuals,
the Cruzan Court held that states may require the fairly rigorous standard of
clear and convincing evidence to attribute this intention to an incompetent
individual, Cruzan at 282.
Where a patient has never been mentally competent to make such a decision,
courts will sometimes allow his intention to be inferred. Some courts will use a
'substituted judgment' standard, where it is determined what the intention of
the incompetent person would be if he had an opinion on the subject. Some use
the more
16
17practical test of attempting to determine 'objectively' what would be in the best
interest of the incompetent patient.'1
Thus, at base, the Cruzan right to die is very narrowly construed. Often,
doctors simply disregard living wills. Equally, courts are wary to enforce them
unless the individual's intention s unarguably clear and unless the type of medical
intervention which the patients opted to refuse is precisely that for which he has
become a candidate. Thus, there is a gap between theory and practice with
respect to both types of rights to die. While the Cruzan right to die is legally
required, it is not always honoured. On the other hand, the legal prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide has not completely stopped it from being practiced.
Nor, as we have seen in the case of the infamous Dr. Kevorkian, has it stopped
juries from acquitting doctors who engage in its practice. Ironically, however,
as was reported in a recent New York Times article, there have been few... if any
documented cases of terminally|ill patients using the legal means instituted by the
state of Oregon to end their lives.12
Current Legal Status of the Right to Stay Alive
As I mentioned above, the only Supreme Court case that even referred to
what I have called the right to stay alive was the 1979 Laetrile case. As I
also mentioned, however, the Court's holding in that case turned entirely on a
statutory interpretation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. sec.
301 et seq., which continues to govern the law in this area.
As the Laetrile case noted, section 505 of the Act requires that all new
drugs be subject to FDA's review and approval processes, which demand that
the drugs be proven safe and
17
18eective before they are allowed to enter the market. The approval process for the
typical new drug takes between seven to thirteen years and consists of essentially four
stages. First, the drug manufacturer must conduct preclinical research, e.g. test the
drug on animals, in order to obtain clearance from FDA to proceed with its testing.
If the drug passes the initial preclinical research test, manufacturers will then have to
undertake three phases of clinical research on the drug, in which the drug will be
tested on human subjects.13
Phase I is designed to test the safety of the drug. In this phase, the drug is
administered usually to healthy subjects in increasing doses to test for adverse side
eects. If no substantial adverse side eects are discovered, the drug enters Phase
II, where its ecacy is evaluated. It is usually not until this stage that the drug
is tested on patients suering from the disease which the drug is intended to
treat, and even at this point, only a small number of patients are allowed into
the study.
If the drug is determined to be eective after this stage, it will then be tested in
Phase III on many more patients suering from the disease which it is intended to
treat. Although hundreds, and even thousands, of patients will be able to participate
in Phase III of the clinical research, the purpose of which is to detect adverse
reactions and potential interactions of the new drug with
other medications,14 some of these patients will be given placebos, and so will
not enjoy the benet of the new drug. In any case, a typical new drug must
pass through these three stages in order to qualify to be submitted for new drug
approval, the process by which FDA reviews the relevant data for approval purposes.
The entire process costs between $30 million and $50 million.
18
19Although, as the Laetrile Court pointed out, the FDA does not exempt the terminally-
ill from the reach of its statute, it has, on response to avid lobbies on the part of cancer
and AIDS suerers, made certain concessions regarding its review and approval process
for potentially life-saving drugs for diseases for which no other eective treatment or
cure exists.
First, FDA has established a prioritized system of review, under which drugs are
classied into three categories, determined by the importance of the therapeutic gain
expected to be derived from them. Drugs intended to treat or cure diseases for which
no other eective treatment or cure exists are given highest priority. Most likely
for practical purposes, however, adherence to the priority schedule of review is not
absolute. Review of Type A Drugs, e.g. those drugs considered to have the most
important therapeutic gain will not trump every other obligation of the FDA. For
instance, a 30 day safety review for a newly submitted IND
takes precedence over even a high priority NDA....15 Equally, in response to the
rise in number of drugs intended
to treat diseases for which no alternative treatments exists, FDA recanted its re-
quirement that investigational drugs not be used for treatment purposes. Currently,
FDA recognizes compassionate INDs, under which investigational drugs can be used
for treatment on patients who meet FDA's protocol criteria. The criteria under which
an investigational new drug would be allowed to terminally|ill patients was
codied in section 312.7(d) (1), which requires that:
(1) the drugs is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening dis-
ease; (2) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy
available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient population;
(3) the drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical trial under an IND in
eect for the trial, or all clinical trials have been completed; and (4) the sponsor of
the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing
19
20marketing approval of the investigational drug with due
diligence (312.34(b) (1)) 16
FDA has allowed the ecacy of certain drugs intended to prevent terminal diseases
to be established on the basis of surrogate endpoints (as opposed to clinical endpoints)
, which recognize certain criteria as indicative of the drug's ecacy at an earlier stage
than is required for most drugs. FDA has also allowed sponsors to charge money
for investigational drugs, where
this is necessary to eect continued research of them.17 In addition to allowing
terminally-ill patients certain premarket access to drugs, FDA has instituted an
expedited process for drugs intended to treat life-threatening diseases, dened
as those diseases where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease
is interrupted. (sec. 312.81) . The procedures involve early consultation between FDA
and drug sponsors (sec. 312.82) to determine a course of action most in accordance
with requirements for pre-market approval. After Phase I, FDA and the sponsor will
seek to reach agreement on the proper design of phase 2 controlled clinical trials,
with the goal that such research will be adequate to provide sucient data on the
product's safety and eectiveness, to gain market approval. After phase 2, FDA
will grant market approval if it decides that the benets of marketing the drug
will outweigh the potential risks. If FDA allows the drug to be marketed at this
point, it may seek agreement from the sponsor (sec. 312.85) to conduct certain
postmarketing (phase 4) studies....18 These expedited procedures reduce the
approval process time on the average from eight to two years.
Congress has also instituted special provisions for drugs
intended to treat orphan diseases, such as ALS, which are diseases
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21from which less than 200,000 persons in the United States suer. Under the
Orphan Drug Act, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983), Congress has required the IRS to provide
tax credits for expenditures on clinical testing of orphan drugs, and required FDA
to provide sponsors with written recommendations for necessary animal and clinical
investigations and to encourage open label INDs for orphan drugs, which would allow
suerers from orphan diseases to have access to
the drugs for treatment at the investigational stage.19 Despite all of the conces-
sions that FDA has made for
terminally|ill patients with regard to its approval process, many are still not
satised. It is has been argued that FDA construes its criteria for treatment
use of a new drug at the investigational stage quite strictly, despite the fact that
the rules have been
substantially liberalized. 20 Equally, the idea of allowing surrogate endpoints
for drugs intended to treat life-threatening disease, though in theory benecial,
results in many practical
ambiguities, which curb its use.2'
Additionally, although FDA has designed procedures by which approved drugs
can enter the market more quickly, there are still many drugs that are ultimately
disapproved. Disturbingly, a 1980 study showed that only 22 percent of the
deciencies related to the applicant's evidence of safety and eectiveness. Thus,
many drugs that may be substantially benecial are disapproved on fairly
technical grounds.22
Even if the FDA adhered strictly to its liberalized standards for the terminally-
ill, however, the concessions it has made are still discretionary. It is up to the agency
to decide whether drugs and patients meet the criteria necessary to qualify for its
special provisions. Thus, only a limited number of patients will in fact
21
22gain access to not-yet-approved new drugs, and access itself will be limited and con-
trolled. Many of the patients who do qualify to take part in experimental programs
will be administered placebos rather than the actual drug. Equally, many patients
will be conclusively denied access to drugs which have been disapproved on technical,
rather than safety, grounds.
The special provisions set up for the terminally|ill continue to be looked on as
'exceptions', and do not have the status of unqualied rights. Thus, despite concessions
on the part of Congress and the FDA, pre|market access for the terminally-ill to
unapproved drugs continues to be discretionary, limited and controlled. Not only is it
not guaranteed, but there are many patients to whom it will be denied. What the
terminally|ill are entitled to as a matter of right is simply not the relevant issue.
An Argument for the Right to Stay Alive Based on Arguments for
the Right to Die
We see that, while there is fairly clear legislation regarding the legal status of
the right to die, the legal picture of the the right to stay alive is a bit more fuzzy,
in the sense that no case or statute addresses the issue as such. Regardless of
how this right has been enunciated, however, it is clear that it is being urged.
And being urged more and more strongly as time goes on.
Direct evidence of this are the numerous lobbies initiated by terminally|ill
individuals themselves, which have aimed to persuade FDA not to interfere with
their access to drugs that they want to take. Although recent AIDS lobbyists have
been among the most vociferous, I have already mentioned that the terminally|ill
have been ghting FDA on this issue since it prohibited their access to laetrile for
cancer. I have also mentioned that, since then, the
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23amount and type of pressure being applied to FDA has arguably reached a new and
greater degree. Anecdotal stories such as Harry's were evidently not enough to impress
on FDA that its review process had to be changed. Even in the face of opposition,
it held to its argument that it has a duty to protect everyone, including the
terminally|ill, from potentially unsafe or ineective drugs.
What it took to convince FDA that substantial reform was necessary was direct
and personalized action on the part of AIDS suerers themselves who were willing
to do whatever it took to impress on FDA that they do not want its protection. They
are the ones suering from a dreadful disease, and so they were in the best position to
perform the relevant risk/benet analysis. It was their opinion as to what should
and should not go into their bodies that counted, not anyone else's.
Along the same lines ran the more recent argument of the dietary supplement
lobby, which, although not necessarily dealing with issues of life|and-death mag-
nitude, expressed the same arguments with the same amount of vigor. In fact, the
pressure applied by this lobby was so strong that it managed to have carved out
of the Food and Drug law a distinct and virtually unregulated category for vitamins,
which advocates believe to be benecial to their health. Whether the object of the
debate is dried|up fruit seeds intended to be a cure for cancer or a new drug
purported to stop the progression of AIDS, the point is that there is an everincreasing
emphasis in our society on personal autonomy and freedom of choice and against
governmental paternalism. This is true in a general sense, but more crucially in
specic situations that involve urgent, personal, life-and-death decisions.
As I have said before, the right to die and the right to stay alive are concep-
tually linked on both of these levels. In a more
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24general sense, they are both driven by the same underlying philosophical intuitions,
namely that autonomy and freedom of choice should be given priority; but they
also urge this system of priorities under the same types of circumstances. Advo-
cates do not urge that the government mind its business as a per se rule, under all
circumstances where decisions aecting health and the body are concerned. Their
arguments do not reach the issue of whether every such decision should be decided
in the purely personal realm. Instead, they are implicitly distinguishing normal
situations from those that involve what I have described above as the rights
of the terminally|ill, and urging that the latter be given the special treatment they
deserve.
People want to be able to make decisions concerning their bodies, especially
when these decisions will aect whether and how they live or die. This is
precisely the intuition on which both the right to stay alive and the right to die are
grounded. My question, then, is why the latter seems have made so much more
headway in terms of being generally accepted than the former.
Although I stated above that the Supreme Court has recently upheld two state
laws disallowing physician-assisted suicide as not unconstitutional, I also men-
tioned that it ended its opinion by encouraging debate over the issue at the
state level. A brief look at the structure and content of both the majority and
concurring opinions for the companion cases of Glucksberg and Quill will show a
sympathy for | or at least a recognition of | the intuitive force of the right to die,
on the part of all of the Supreme Court Justices, lurking behind the rigidity with
which they dismiss the right.
In the rst part of its opinion, the Glucksberg majority quickly decides that the
right which respondents are asserting is not one that is traditionally constitutionally-
recognized. It is
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25not a fundamental right. This is the rst question that must be answered in a
substantive due process analysis. If the answer is no, the case is essentially
closed. The state must only show that its statute is reasonably related to a legitimate
state end. If the right asserted does not meet the threshold requirement of being one
that is protected by the constitution, there remains no further need for the Court
to engage in part two of the due process analysis, which involves a balancing test that
weighs the asserted right against possible competing government interests, and
subjects the
statute to the most rigid 23
state's scrutiny.
As just stated, the Glucksberg majority did in fact decide that what it strategi-
cally called the right to commit suicide [and have] assistance in doing so, Glucksberg
at 2269, is both implicitly and explicitly disfavored by the constitution. Evi-
dence of this was the fact that 'regular' suicide was traditionally illegal, and was
legalized only as a conciliatory gesture towards the people left behind. Thus, in
attempting to prove that the right to physician|assisted suicide is not a fundamen-
tal right, the majority essentially conates the distinction between physician-
assisted suicide and regular suicide, justifying its rejection of the right to the
latter by appealing to our instinct to want to discourage the former.
After characterizing the right asserted by respondents in this very unsympa-
thetic light, however, the Glucksberg majority goes on to perform a full|edged
due process balancing test, discussing the right asserted by respondents in the
context of practically every conceivable competing state interest. Thus, despite its re-
luctance to admit that this right could in any way be construed as fundamental
from history or tradition, the majority goes on to
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26aord it the same degree of analysis that it would a constitutionally-protected right.
If the majority felt compelled to weigh the right asserted in Clucksberg against
competing state interests, we might wonder why it was so quick to deny the right
any constitutional signicance. The explanation is most likely that the volatility
of the right and the heated debate which currently surrounds it induced the majority
to make a conscious decision to cut it o at its roots, lest it open up a pandora's
box. This was a good psychological move. By denying that the asserted right was
one that could be construed to be constitutionally recognized, the majority relieved the
state statutes that purportedly infringed on this right from being subject to rigorous
scrutiny and required them only to have a rational relation to a legitimate state end.
Despite its initial reluctance to give any credence to the right asserted by re-
spondents, the balancing portion of the majority's opinion suggests that its initial
technical treatment of the issue is not reective of its substantive opinion of it. In
fact, the length and detail with which the majority argued against the right, and
the almost naive formality and rigidity with which it initially dismissed it, might
actually be taken to illustrate a recognition on its part that the right asserted
by respondents is one that has some substance and force. Indeed, it might be
that the majority regarded the right as so explosive that, short of requiring an
unbridled recognition of it (which the majority did not want to do), the only choice
it had was to contain it as tightly as it could.
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27The concurring opinions for Glucksberg and Quill possessed more of a realistic tone.
Though each concurring Justice ultimately agreed with the majority that statutes
prohibiting physician| assisted suicide should not be deemed unconstitutional, each
also had no problem acknowledging the substance and importance of the right to die.
The concurring justices also described the right more charitably as the right to die
with dignity, Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 2307 (Breyer concurring) and acknowledged
the importance of the characterization of a right to an evaluation of its merits. Hence,
the concurring justices were not led ultimately to decide against respondents because
they did not recognize the right being asserted by them, but rather because they
all found various competing state concerns to override the right.
Thus, although the Glucksberg and Quill decisions do not advance the position
of physician-assisted suicide per se, they do not in my opinion, do it much harm.
Although the Court is not requiring states to make the option available to its residents,
it is not disallowing them from doing so either. And while the opinions raise serious
and important considerations against the legal sanction of the right to die, the tone
at least of the concurring justices could even be seen as sympathetic.
Then we have Cruzan, the Supreme Court case which upheld the right of an indi-
vidual to refuse life|sustaining measures and/or be withdrawn from life support.
Here, we have the Supreme Court not only allowing states to make this option
available to its residents, but actually requiring them to do so. Thus, the Cruzan
Court gave ocial recognition to the idea that individuals should have at least the
right to die naturally.
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28Respondents in Quill used this concession on the part of the Court to argue for the
right to physician|assisted suicide. They reasoned that allowing what I will call the
Cruzan right to die, while simultaneously disallowing the option of assisted suicide,
constitutes a violation of equal protection, as some are granted the right to choose
how to die, while other similarly situated people, are not.
In response to this argument, the Quill majority explains that the Cruzan decision
was driven by concerns other than those of personal autonomy or a concession that
individuals have the right to choose how or when to die. As the Quill majority
contended, the justication for the decision was not nearly so deep. Instead, the
Quill majority explains that the Cruzan decision was simply based on the time|
honored common law rule that forcing unwanted medication on someone is considered
a battery. Thus, history shows that we all have the right to refuse unwanted drugs or
medical treatment, a right which is simply inapplicable to the issue of assisted suicide.
In the case of assisted suicide, patients are seeking medication, not exercising their
fundamental right to stay free of it. The Court also held, in line with the sentiment of
the laetrile Court, that terminally-ill individuals do not comprise a suspect class. For
that reason, the issue did not require heightened scrutiny.
Despite the fact that history did give the Quill majority a
hook on which to hang its argument, even Justice Stevens points out
the absurdity of the contention that the Cruzan decision was about a
common|law rule of battery, Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302 at 2306
(Stevens concurring), as did the Supreme Court itself in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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29(1992), when it alluded to its holding in Cruzan as one about personal autonomy and
bodily integrity, with doctrinal anity to cases recognizing limits on governmental
power..., Casey at 857. Additionally, in Cruzan itself, the Court explicitly acknowl-
edged that its decision stemmed from a belief that the choice between life and death
is a deeply personal decision... (emphasis added), Cruzan at 262. Clearly, the Cruzan
decision acknowledges the existence of certain boundaries passed which it is inappro-
priate for the state to tread. But why draw the line there, and not have it encompass
the right to die by physician|assisted suicide? As Stevens points out, the relevant
question with respect to the terminally-ill is how, not whether to die, Glucksberg, 117
S.Ct. 2302, 2307 (Stevens concurring) . It is precisely this type of questioning
which I believe the Quill majority feared.
Thus, as it did in Glucksberg, the majority cut the question o at its roots. Rather
than trying to explain why we should be granted the right to refuse medical treatment
which is necessary to keep us alive, but not be allowed to end our lives with peace
and dignity at a point where death is a certainty, it was easier for the majority to
distinguish Cruzan on historical grounds. In fact, the only substantive discussion in
Quill of the conceptual distinction between the Cruzan right to die and the right to
assisted suicide is the majority's discussion of the 'act/omission' or 'action/inaction'
distinction.
As the Court explains, while Cruzan-type situations involve merely the refusal
of articial substances into the body for the purpose of not being kept alive
unnaturally, assisted suicide requires the ingestion of foreign substances for the
very purpose of
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30dying. As intuitively acceptable as this distinction sounds, it may be undermined
by a fact which Justice O'Connor points out in her concurring opinion, namely that
patients are already allowed to receive palliative care,117 S.Ct.2258, 2290, (O'Connor
concurring) . Under this option, doctors are permitted to administer potent doses
of pain-killing drugs such as morphine which, although not intended to do so, almost
necessarily have the eect of hastening death. Thus, even the theoretically clean|
cut act/omission distinction deteriorates at a practical level. There is no clear|cut
or mechanical formula by which we can determine the appropriate placement of
the line which demarcates the point at which we have carried a right too far.
Though the Glucksberg and Quill opinions are facially formalistic, a deeper look
at what they are saying shows a recognition of this insight. Although the majority in
both cases speaks in terms of black-and|white distinctions, the opinions really seem
to posit a type of moral spectrum, where not interfering with conventional medical
treatment is at one end and ordinary suicide is at the other. The spectrum may be
based on a kind of action/inaction distinction theory, under which the Cruzan
right, which is exercised passively, would correctly be placed far from ordinary
suicide. However, refusing life-saving treatment, even if it is considered articial,
cannot be put on equal footing with receiving conventional medical treatment,
even though exercising the Cruzan right to die does not involve any armative
action that will result in death. The fact that it can be characterized as passive,
however, legitimately enables the Cruzan right to die to be placed far from regular
suicide on the spectrum.
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31Assisted suicide, perhaps because of its unfortunate name, would fall closer in the
Court's judgment to the other side, where regular suicide would be placed. Although
the two acts are dierent not only in degree but in type (e.g. because for people who
seek assisted suicide, imminent death is certain), on a formal level both involve the
taking of steps that will cause death. Under this theory, the act of administering
potent pain-killing drugs which may hasten death, but do not aim to do so, must fall
somewhere in between.
The question then is where does the right to stay alive fall? Well, it depends on
how we interpret the spectrum. If we choose to understand the spectrum as being
based on an action/omission distinction, which might be a legitimate interpretation,
then the right to stay alive - which involves the taking of unapproved medication -
would clearly fall closer to the act side. Since a premise of a spectrum based on an
act/omission distinction would be that any action which may or will result in death
is less innocuous than passivity whose result is the same, we would have a legitimate
basis to deny or at least curb the right to stay alive.
This would not be an unreasonable interpretation, as I think most would con-
cede that there is some substance to the intuition that it is somehow more morally
repugnant to do something that will prompt death than to not do something de-
signed to delay death. The Quill majority describes the distinction as one between
killing and letting die, a distinction which I believe captures a very real instinct and
contains much rhetorical force. In practice, however, the distinction is not so clear.
As Justice Scalia bluntly
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32points out in his Cruzan concurrence, starving oneself to death )by refusing life-saving
hydration and nutrition) is no dierent from putting a gun to one's temple as far as
the common-law denition of suicide is concerned, Cruzan at 296 (Scalia concurring)
In defense of the Quill majority, however, I would like to bring up another
distinction which it nds important in distinguishing the refusal of life|support from
assisted suicide. In justifying the former, the Court makes the point that, al-
though the refusal of life|sustaining medical treatment may have the consequence of
hastening an individual's death, dying is not the goal of the individual who makes this
decision. On the contrary, the individual usually hopes to live, but simply wants to
do so naturally. In the case of the individual seeking assisted suicide, however,
the goal is precisely to die; death is what the individual is seeking. Thus, the
Court looks beyond the nature of the act itself to the intention of the individual
who requests it.
Under an action/inaction analysis, it is clear that the right to stay alive involves
doing rather than not doing something. However, it does not involve doing some-
thing with the intention of hastening death. Thus, if we took the spectrum to be
intention| based - with the intention to live on the top and the intention to die on
the bottom | the right to stay alive would clearly be placed above both assisted
suicide and the refusal of life|support. In fact, the right to stay alive would mark
the upper boundary of the spectrum, as it is motivated by the most unrelenting
will to ght death as strenuously as possible. Thus, we would construe it as the
antithesis to regular suicide, which, because it is based precisely on the will to
die, would occupy the spot at the bottom.
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33Thus, as we see, the placement of the various acts on the spectrum depends on what
we take the basis of the distinction and comparison to be. While the general ac-
tion/inaction distinction is an intuitively plausible basis for analogy, does it not
make more sense, when we are dealing with issues of living and dying, to order the acts
in question according to the extent to which each involves the will to live? Interpreting
the spectrum this way, we would interpret the right to stay alive as the paradigmatic
expression of an intention to live. In fact, we might even be committed to con-
sidering the right to stay alive more morally admirable than the common decision to
undergo conventional medical treatment. After all, what could be more commendable
than ghting to stay alive in the face of the bleakest odds? What could be more in
line with the fundamental intuition to preserve life than the determination to try
anything to accomplish this goal?
In attempting to explain why refusal of life-support should be allowed while assisted
suicide is not, the Quill majority oers a range of distinctions between the two, some
of which are articial and some of which are more substantive. By doing so, it goes
to great lengths to avoid admitting any essential link between the two, thereby
obviating the need to engage in conceptual or psychological line-drawing. What I
believe was truly motivating the majority, however, was the simple, and reasonable,
intuition that refusal of life|support is simply more okay, according to the values
which we take our constitution and society to embrace, than assisted suicide.
Maybe it is because the latter involves activity while the former only involves
passivity. More likely, however, it is because the former is not inconsistent with the
will to live, while the latter by its terms explicitly rejects it. If I am right, then it
seems
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34that an assertion of the right to stay alive, if formulated as such, should have some
pretty strong constitutional footing. After all, because of notions that we take to be
fundamental to our society, it would be hard to interpret our constitution to require,
no less protect, an act that expresses an intention to die. On the other hand, it seems
that a right which is based on an intention to stay live is one which we would hope that
our Constitution protects as fundamental. As the Cruzan majority states it cannot be
disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest
in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, Cruzan at 262.
As I mentioned earlier, cries of autonomy and freedom of choice are rampant
these days with respect to life and death issues. Equally, however, the Supreme Court
itself has given certain of these rights a constitutional imprimatur. Thus, we have
the Supreme Court construing the constitution to require that individuals have the
choice of whether or not to be kept alive articially. We have the positive pressure of
a society that is looking to expand the province in which personal autonomy governs.
We even have one state which has responded to this pressure by passing legislation
allowing terminally-ill individuals to take their own lives. The fact is that society is
becoming more and more intolerant of the government making decisions that concern
how and whether we live and die. Evidence that this feeling is justied might be
the fact that the people who are screaming the loudest are the terminally-ill
themselves, and their loved ones. Who better to judge what feels most right
and most comforting to people living under such dire circumstances than the
people most intimately connected to the situation?
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35Without even reaching the merits of the various 'rights to die, however, it seems logical
to concede that if we are going to allow any special privileges to the terminally|ill in
matters of dying, there should not even be a question whether we should allow them
special privileges with respect to matters of living. Stevens points out in his
Cruzan dissent that choices about death touch the core of liberty... Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality are
undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental', Cruzan at 343. But if the choice to die is connected so intimately
to our liberty, then must not the choice to live be as well? Do not societal attitudes
and the basic elements of our constitution imply, if not demand, recognition of the
right to try to stay alive?
We might base an armative answer to this question on the right to privacy
and personal autonomy arguments asserted and accepted in Cruzan and the abortion
cases. The Casey case, which I referred to above - which conrms the decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) that the right of a woman to choose abortion
is a fundamental right - speaks of the Constitution's promise that ... matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choice central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Casey at 923. What could be more tting of
this description of protected rights than one which allows a person the choice of
taking medication intended to keep him alive. Even more pertinent are the
statements by the Court recognizing the freedom to care for one's health and
person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion..., Doe v. Bolton, 410 US 179
(1979), 214, (Douglas
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36concurring), and the limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment
or to bar its rejection, (emphasis added), Casey at 857. Cruzan stands in part for the
proposition that forced treatment may burden [an] individual's liberty interes[tJ,
Cruzan at 288, (O'Connor concurring) . However, to contend that prohibiting an
individual from taking medication which he wants to take to attempt to prolong his life
is dierent in type from forcing medication on him would again be to inappropriately
inate the practical weight of the action/inaction distinction. While the former is
passive while the latter is active, both types of interference on the part of the
government infringe on an individual's physical freedom, Cruzan at 287, (O'Connor
concurring)
Without even having to appeal to concepts of bodily integrity and personal
autonomy, however, it seems implausible that the Constitution would not be construed
as protecting the right to try to stay alive at its most fundamental level. After all, with
regular suicide on the opposite end of the spectrum of the right to stay alive, we may
take the historical disapproval and disdain of the former, which the court dwells
on at length in Glucksberg, to negatively imply a historical advocacy of the latter.
Later in the paper, I will explore how the right to stay alive can be construed
by a kind of negative implication from the Supreme Court's right to die discussions.
For now, however, I will assume, on the basis of my analysis regarding what I
take to be the underlying motivations for the Court's treatment of the various
right to die issues, and on the basis the more explicit statements which I cited
from the Court's abortion cases, that the Court could nd a legitimate
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37historical/traditional basis to construe that the right to stay alive is worthy of consti-
tutional protection.
Even if the right to stay alive were deemed to meet the threshold requirement of
being characterized as fundamental, however, the substantive due process analysis
does not stop there. As I mentioned above, if the Court were to make the initial
determination that there is some substance to the right to stay alive, it would still
have to proceed to weigh the personal interests at stake for the people asserting
the right against any potential competing interests at stake for the government
and society. In so doing, the Court would in eect have to make a determination
as to which interests are more important on balance to honour. However, the burden
at this point is shifted to the government - in this case the Legislature or FDA - to
prove that its
statute serves a compelling interest.24
Although a substantial and vocal segment of the nation strongly urges an accep-
tance of the right to die, there are also those who vehemently oppose it. The
concerns of these groups are discussed in the majority and concurring opinions
for Glucksberg and Quill, and, as we see by the results of these cases, have been
taken quite seriously, even by those justices who express a belief that there is
some substance to the right. To extend my hypothetical constitutional analysis of the
right to stay alive, I will dedicate my next section to identifying and evaluating
the weight of government interests which both have been and could be asserted
against the right to stay alive, if it were subjected to a due process balancing
test.
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38Again, I will use the Court's discussion in Glucksberg to guide my analysis, as many
of the objections raised against assisted suicide are analogously applicable to the right
to stay alive. In discussing these objections, I will evaluate whether any distinction
between the right to die and the right to stay alive would enable the latter to
withstand the objection.
The Right to Stay Alive vs. Possible Competing State Interests
It pretty much goes without saying that the most forceful argument against
allowing terminally|ill patients to choose to try unapproved drugs is that the
drugs may not only be ineective, but may actually be unsafe. This seems to be
the main concern that was driving the opinion of the Laetrile court. Although,
formally, its opinion was based on an interpretation of administrative law and
procedures, it does, as does the Glucksberg Court, allude to several substantive
government interests that might stand in opposition to allowing the terminally-
ill access to unapproved medication. As the Court points out, it is the function
of the FDA to protect not only healthy people, but sick people as well. Relying
on the legislative history of the 1938 Act, the Court points out that Congress
actually expressed concern that individuals with fatal illnesses, such as cancer,
should be shielded from fraudulent cures Rutherford at 2475. Thus, rather than
being exempt from the reach of the FD&C Act, the terminally-ill were among
those deemed to need special protection against unapproved drugs.
On the other side of this very forceful argument, however, we have what is proba-
bly the most often-expressed and most forceful counterargument to this contention,
namely the question of 'who cares'? If an individual is suering from an illness
for which there is no cure or treatment, then what he does have to lose by
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39trying a drug that may save his life? There is no down side, and the up side is huge.
Safety and eectiveness lose their meaning when applied to people who are already
dying. This sentiment was expressed by the Appeals Court in the Laetrile case which
reasoned that [s)ince [terminally-ill cancer patients] would 'die of cancer regardless
of what may be done'... there were no realistic standards against which to measure
the safety and eectiveness of a drug for that class of individuals Rutherford at 2474,
citing 582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1978) . Construing this logic strictly, the case is pretty
convincing. So convincing in fact that we might wonder how FDA could ever and
under any circumstances justify keeping potentially lifesaving drugs from the market,
or delaying their entry while the review process is being implemented. For, when
imminent death is the only alternative, isn't even a potentially unsafe stab at a cure
better than no cure at all?
If that were truly the extent of the question, then I believe that not many would
have a hard time answering yes '. However , we know that the situations with
respect to which this question arises are not in fact nearly so black|and|white.
As just stated, it would be dicult to justify 'protecting' someone, who was literally
about to die, from a potentially unsafe, but potentially life-saving drug. However, the
point at which a person is about to die is almost impossible to identify, except
in retrospect. In fact, not all people who have been diagnosed with an incurable
illness are even facing imminent death.
To use the example I began with, patients diagnosed with ALS, for which no cure
or substantially eective treatment exists, may live up to three to ve years from the
date of diagnosis. This is true of AIDS and some types of cancer as well, for which
the average life span after diagnosis may even be longer. Thus, by withholding
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40potentially unsafe drugs from the market, or limiting their availability, the FDA may
be protecting these people, though not from eventual death, at least from giving
up possibly several more years of life because an unreviewed drug turned out to have
serious or debilitating side eects. Even if we were to provide that drugs to which
the terminally-ill would have access at least be required to pass a phase I|type of
safety test, as FDA's compassionate access plan sensibly requires, patients would still
have access to drugs whose combination eects would not yet have been tested. Thus,
although the drugs would have been deemed safe in the abstract, in combination
with other drugs, they might be harmful, or even lethal. If the terminally-ill had an
unqualied right of access to unapproved drugs, however, they would not be required
to have their trials of the drugs monitored.
Thus, it is not completely true that there would be no down side to allowing the
terminally-ill access to unapproved drugs. For the reasons just stated, it could turn
out that taking a new and unapproved drug would leave a terminally|ill individual
in worse condition than he was from his original illness. If this happened, there would
always be the regret that, if the patient was forced to wait, he might at least have had
some more time to live under relatively normal conditions.
Equally, while he was waiting, a better form of treatment might have been
discovered. As the Cruzan Court points out, there is always the possibility of
advancements in medical science, Cruzan at 282, which could make one regret
his decision to take a risk. For these and other reasons, the question of whether
terminally-ill individuals should have access to unapproved drugs is not nearly
as straightforward as some might imagine. Instead, it is clouded by numerous
questions, some of which we can try to answer,
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41but some of which we simply cannot. At what point can we conclude that someone
is terminally|ill? When, if ever, is it appropriate to give up hope? The only
thing that is certain is that it is not certain that terminally-ill individuals have
nothing to lose by not waiting. In fact, if their particular disease allows them
to live long enough, they might even have something to gain.
Going back to my example, however, a person diagnosed with ALS could die
within months. Because the life span after diagnosis varies so extensively from per-
son to person, there is no telling when a person with ALS is about to die, except
maybe when the disease has advanced to a point beyond which the success of
any treatment would have already become quite unlikely. Thus, some individ-
uals diagnosed as terminally|ill do not have the time to wait. In those cases,
keeping drugs from them which have even the slightest chance of improving or
even stabilizing their condition is in eect promoting their death. The problem is
that these cases can usually not be distinguished ex ante from cases where the
patient does have time to wait.
Basically, the decision of whether to allow terminally-ill patients premature
access to certain drugs comes down to weighing the risks associated with both sides.
On one side, we have the risk that the drug will not work and will actually worsen
the person's condition and shorten or interfere with whatever time remains of his
life. However, as any regime that provided for access on the part of the terminally-ill
to unapproved drugs would likely require at least that the drugs be tested for
safety, this is not very likely. The only real risk would be that the patient has a
particular negative sensitivity to the drug or is taking one or more other drugs
with which the new drug detrimentally interacts.
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42On the other side, we have the consideration that the person's days might be num-
bered anyway, though just how numbered is a question about which it is often
dicult to speculate. On the positive side, we may be saving a lot of lives. Most
people who suer from terminal illnesses do not enjoy a very high quality of life as
a consequence of their condition. Thus, a drug that decreased their quality of life,
but added years to it, like chemotherapy, would likely be very much welcomed. It
is true that a new and unapproved drug might take a greater toll on the health and
quality of life of a terminally|ill individual than his underlying disease already has;
it is also true that a terminally|ill individual could live for years without treat-
ment, during which time a safer and/or more eective drug might come along and
actually be approved. These risks should not be ignored.
Just given the odds, however, it seems that these scenarios would ensue much
less frequently than would those in which lives of terminally|ill individuals would be
saved by allowing them access to unapproved drugs. Equally, it seems clear, based
on statements and outcries of the terminally|ill themselves, that any risks which
might be associated with taking unapproved drugs are ones that they are willing to
take.
True, the severity of their conditions may cause them to underestimate the
risks of something purported to help them. Thus, they might not approach the
benet/risk calculation with as much scientic objectivity as would a doctor or the like.
On the other hand, however, why shouldn't the pain and/or hopelessness which
plagues the lives of the terminally-ill be a relevant factor to their benet/risk
calculations. Remember, granting the right to stay alive would not force the
terminally|ill to take unapproved medication; it would merely give them the
choice of doing so. If,
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43in their opinion, that measure seems warranted, who is to say that it is not? Why
is a more removed perspective necessarily a better one? While there are clearly
interests weighing against allowing the terminally-ill access to unapproved drugs,
there are very forceful reasons to do so on other side. Though it is impossible
to make a scientic determination of which interests are stronger, it seems that,
all in all, the benets associated with allowing the terminally-ill the choice to take
unapproved medication which may save their lives outweigh the risks.
The same type of what if arguments presented against allowing the right to
stay alive could easily be formulated into arguments against assisted suicide.
However, there, the counterarguments may not be as strong, as the stakes are
clearly much higher. If a drug which a terminally|ill individual experimented with
turned out to have negative side eects, it is quite possible that the situation
could be corrected. Equally, a medical breakthrough pertaining to his disease
could quite possibly save him, even if he has prematurely taken ineective med-
ication. With respect to assisted suicide, however, there is literally no turning
back. Once the right has been exercised, it cannot be retracted. Nor can the sit-
uation be rectied. Unlike the risks involved in granting the right to stay alive -
which may not materialize and will probably be outweighed | the risk involved
in granting the right to die is certain, calculable and irreversible. Whether we
are talking about refusing life-saving medical treatment or about taking lethal
medication supplied by a physician, the consequence of exercising the right to
die is death.
On the other hand, giving the terminally-ill access to unapproved medica-
tions only presents a slight risk of the possibility of death - and it is intended to
delay it. Thus, even
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44when we consider its worst possible downside, the right to stay alive comes out looking
more innocuous than even the permissible Cruzan-type of right to die. To reiterate
Stevens observation, terminally-ill individuals do not have the choice of whether to
die. They are already dying. Why not let people who are willing to experiment with
unapproved drugs try to put o this fate as long as possible? Sure, an unapproved
drug may have detrimental consequences. But, these consequences could not be
as detrimental as those which ensue when a person refuses life|supports or is
removed from a respirator.
Another objection which may be raised against allowing the right to stay alive is
one that can be inferred from the Supreme Court's discussion of assisted suicide
in Glucksberg. The concern there is that it is dicult to determine whether a
given person is competent to exercise the right to assisted suicide. The same
question can be easily applied to the right to stay alive. Whether a particular
person is competent enough to make life and death decisions is not a question to
which there is a simple yes-or-no answer. Even if it were determinable in an
theoretical sense, it may be epistemologically dicult to determine in fact. Because
no one, including doctors, can read people's minds, we have no denitive way of
knowing whether a person's decision is the product of a reective and informed
analysis or instead sparked by a possibly eeting whim. With respect to assisted
suicide, however, the biggest threat of this public health concern, Glucksberg at 2272,
comes from the fact that suicidal impulse is most often the result of clinical,
and treatable, depression rather than that of a real and thought-out desire to
end one's life based on the suering that accompanies terminal illness, Glucksberg
at 2272. Therefore, terminally|ill patients who experience this impulse may need
to be
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45saved from themselves. As evidence of this, the Glucksberg majority points out that, in
many cases, patients who are prevented from being allowed to end their lives eventually
turn out to be grateful to be alive..., Glucksberg at 2272.
Although the specic threat of clinical depression does not arise in the context
of the right to stay alive, the issue of a patient's competency is nonetheless quite
relevant. Often, a patient whose physical state has deteriorated to the point where
he would chose the option of trying unapproved drugs may not be in the requisite
mental state to make such a sensitive decision. More relevantly, how do we en-
sure that a patient even understands the information on which his decision is
based. It is dicult for anyone to understand abstract concepts such as actuarial
probabilities, not to mention the medical jargon that might accompany an ex-
planation of a drug's potential side eects. Thus, even if a person is competent
in a psychological sense, he may not be competent in a practical sense. He may
be making a decision on the basis of misperceived or misconstrued information.
Relatedly, we have the concern of potential coercion, which the Glucksberg
majority also brings up. The worry there is that, if assisted suicide were a legally
viable option, a terminally-ill patient might feel pressured to choose it on the
inappropriate basis of nancial or emotional considerations. With respect to
the former, the Supreme Court fears that patients will feel compelled to end
their lives prematurely, when the alternative is to live with extensive medical
treatment and/or supervision which is placing a huge nancial burden on their
family. Because they are going to die soon anyway, and most often the greatest
percentage of money spent on medical care is expended during the nal days of
a
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46person's illness, they might feel that it is right to spare their family that extra expense.
Equally, many terminally-ill individuals want to spare their family the agony of
having to see them suering unbearable pain. If not for their family and friends, they
might be able to endure the pain of their illness. In combination with the pain that
their loved ones feel on their behalf, however, the pressure might become too great
to bear. Thus, terminally-ill patients might choose the option of assisted suicide, if
available, in order to end the pain of their loved ones, even if they themselves would
otherwise have been able to bear the pain.
While it may be noble for a terminally-ill patient to make a decision to end his
life on the basis of one or both of these considerations, it does not accord with the
idea of free choice and autonomy. Instead, it rings of coercion. The point is that
the very existence of the option of assisted suicide may serve as a coercive force to
choose it. The same concern - at least with respect to the idea of emotional coercion -
easily applies to the choice which candidates for experimental medication would face
if they were given unrestricted access to unapproved drugs. Even though a particular
individual may not feel comfortable trying an unapproved drug, he might be subject
to pressures from his family and friends who see him deteriorating and urge him to
try anything.
Equally, he himself may feel pressured by the very availability of a choice. He
might prefer to die a more natural death than to experiment with a bunch of new and
unapproved drugs that could cause him physical pain or try his emotional state. He
may be a fatalist, who believes that if he was meant to be saved by a particular drug,
the review process for it would end before it is too late for him to use it eectively. If
he were simply denied
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47access to unapproved drugs, he would know that there is nothing he could do
to help himself. Given the option, however, he is presented with a very dicult
choice which, regardless of which side he comes down on, entails a lot of what
if's. Denying him the option would at least relieve him of one more dicult choice
to face at an already confusing time in his life.
Another question that the Glucksberg court considers in its discussion of assisted
suicide is the impact which a legal sanction of the option would have on the
medical profession in general. In the court's opinion, the most detrimental way
in which allowing physician-assisted suicide would compromise the ethics of the
medical profession would be by undermining the traditional conception of the
doctor as healer. How could patients be expected to retain condence in their
doctors if, instead of trying to improve their condition, they are agreeing to help
them die? Clearly, that specic concern would not apply to right-to-live situations,
in which patients are asking their doctors to help them stay alive. However, a
doctor's belief that his terminally|ill patient should have special and premature
access to medications may actually have a similar negative psychological impact
on the patient.
In the case of assisted suicide, a doctor's agreement to assist a patient in
ending his life may actually be a signal to the patient of what he interprets as
the doctor's statement that all hope is gone. In a strange way, the same might go
for the doctor who supports his patient's decision to try unapproved drugs. Although
the ultimate goal is clearly to help the patient, the patient may take the doctor's
acquiescence to his request as a signal from the doctor that his case is virtually
hopeless. Thus, he may begin to lose faith himself.
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48While this might work to the psychological detriment of the patient, it is likely that,
at that stage in the game, the patient would be used to the fact that the outlook
is bleak. Thus, the only real harm that might arise would be if a patient took
his doctor's willingness to provide him with unapproved drugs as a conrmation
that his doctor thinks it would be a good idea. A request by a patient for
unapproved drugs might merely be that patient's way of asking his doctor whether
his doctor thinks that course of action would be advisable. By acquiescing, a doctor
might inadvertently be endorsing a form a treatment about which he is actually
ambivalent or even wary of; whereas, without as many choices and without
as much discretion, the treatment process is much more straightforward. Although
choice breeds possibilities for misunderstanding and misinterpretation, these
barriers are clearly not insurmountable. Eventually, doctors would get used to
having these additional options available and be able correctly to interpret their
patients' desires as they do with respect to currently available treatments.
Another related concern is the psychological impact which a decision to give
them special treatment might have on the terminally-ill. In Glucksberg, the court
expressed the concern that allowing the terminally-ill the option of ending their
lives would send a message to them that their lives are less valuable than the
lives of healthy people. The same can be said for allowing the terminally-ill
access to medication from which it is believed that the rest of us should be
protected. To the individuals requesting the medication, the negative impact
would not be great. In fact, it probably wouldn't be felt at all, for they are
getting what they asked for.
The concern really arises with respect to that segment of the terminally-ill
population which does not advocate the use of
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49unapproved medication. These people might be discouraged at the message that they
perceive society to be sending. Why should they be less protected than the rest
of us? Is the state of their lives truly that hopeless? Why should they be allowed
to be guinea pigs for potentially unsafe drugs? What kind of commentary does that
make regarding the importance with which society views the value of their lives? While
viewing the terminally|ill as a special category of people deserving special treatment
will obviously benet those terminally|ill individuals who request to be treated that
way, it may damage the morale of those terminally|ill individuals who want to be
treated like everyone else.
Another common objection to the legal sanction of assisted suicide concerns the
fear that doctors may be driven by economic incentives to encourage their patients
to choose this option. This concern would be equally if not more relevant were
doctors to be allowed to treat their patients with unapproved drugs. While
doctors might not have too many economic incentives to encourage their patients
to end their lives, it is possible that they would have incentives to try out new
drugs on their patients. For example, a doctor in a research hospital might have
worked on the development of a given drug, which it would then be in his best
interest to market. Also, doctors or hospitals often have certain loyalties to
particular manufacturing companies, whose drugs they would be inclined to
promote. What better a forum for experimentation could they be given? If the
right to live were granted, a patient's consent | and desire | to try unapproved
medication would free the doctor or hospital of liability. Doctors would be able
to eectively bypass the FDA review process, and experiment rst-hand on
willing human subjects. Equally, the results from these studies could be used
to speed up the regular FDA
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50approval process for the drug, allowing it to become available sooner to people whom
it may eventually benet, but who have not yet become diagnosed as terminally|ill.
None of this sounds too bad - and indeed it would not be if the interests of doctors
and patients were identical. The fact is, however, that, while many doctors will put
their patients' interests rst, many will be driven primarily by some of their own.
Clearly, no rational doctor would want to jeopardize a patient's health. The problem
with experimental drugs, however, is that it is not that clear what eect they will
have on the human body. For that reason, it is likely that doctors will jump at the
opportunity to try them out on willing patients. If they work, great. Then, they
will get credit for helping to cure the patient. Their professional reputation will be
beneted, and likely, they will attract more patients. If not, they have the law - and
their patients' consent |behind them to free them of liability. If the right to stay alive
were constitutionally-recognized, then doctors could not deny patients who requested
unapproved but potentially life|saving drugs the opportunity to try out such drugs.
Thus, while the success of a new drug would provide benets to both the doctor and
the patient, the failure of it would not entail any serious downside from the doctor's
perspective.
There might be a downside to the patient, however. And because doctors might
reap certain benets from being successful in treating or implementing a cure for a
terminal condition, we might have to worry whether they would take the potential risks
to their patients seriously enough in weighing the benets and risks of the situation.
Doctors might become so zealous to cure their terminally-ill patients that they
would undermine the potential
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51risks associated with a particular drug and inate the possibility of its success, even
in their own minds.
Could this subtle and likely even unintentional manipulation be avoided? Pos-
sibly. But the eorts would have to come from doctors themselves, as decisions
regarding the proper type and dosage of an unapproved drug are arguably better
left to doctors than to the patients. It is this type of concern that likely under-
lies the intuition of those who are reluctant to let patients -even in conjunction
with their doctors | take the matter into their own hands. Correspondingly,
it is for this type of reason that proponents of the FDA believe that an inde-
pendent agency, committed to determining objectively the risks and benets of
new drugs, is the most appropriate judge of which drugs should and should not
be taken. The risks associated with leaving the issue up to doctors and patients
might be great enough to justify the paternalistic aspect of FDA's function.
A related objection to allowing doctors to provide terminally| ill patients
with unapproved medications is the concern that doctors might become somewhat
desensitized to the value of human life. This concern is clearly more pronounced
in the context of assisted suicide, where doctors would be authorized by law
eectively to kill their failing patients. Though less extreme, the concern arises in
the context of the question whether doctors should be allowed to treat their
patients with unapproved drugs. As I said above, no doctor will want to be
responsible for worsening his patient's physical condition. With a license from
the legislature or the Supreme Court to experiment on their patients at the
patients' request, however, doctors will likely become accustomed to a new set
of ethical standards.
51
52From one perspective, doctors may become more attuned to ethical concerns, as they
will be put in the position of making decisions which previously they could rely
on the FDA to make. Thus, a certain burden of responsibility will be shifted to
practicing doctors. On the other hand, the decision of whether experimental drugs
will be used for treatment would really and ultimately be up to the patient himself,
as the bearer of the relevant right. Thus, a doctor who obtains his patient's consent
essentially has a green light on the matter. Although he would still be expected to use
discretion and prudence in advising his patient, there is not much room for a doctor
to go wrong. When a person is facing imminent death, any option is likely to sound
like a good option; indeed, from the patient's perspective, things probably couldn't
seem any worse. For this reason, a patient might not be any more likely to blame a
doctor if an unapproved drug were unsuccessful, or even harmful, than he would be if
the doctor had treated him with an approved drug.
If there were truly no other available treatments or cures for a given disease, then I
suppose no harm would really be done. Often, however, new drugs are produced as
substitutes or improvements for other existing treatments. In Harry's case, there were
already certain approved drugs on the market that purported to slow the progress of
ALS. The experimental drug which he was scheduled to try was designed to be more
eective. Thus, giving doctors discretion to treat their patients with unapproved drugs
-even if the patient's consent is needed - might incline doctors towards recommending
this option at the expense of more traditional and already-approved treatment. Even if
the doctor were to explain to his patients that approved, but probably less eective,
drugs were available, his mere statement that new and potentially more
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53eective drugs were available might legitimate this option in the patient's eyes.
Eventually, the line between approved drugs - which have undergone rigorous
testing and evaluation - and unapproved drugs -which would have been subject to
only the most minimal testing -could become blurred. Human beings would become
guinea pigs in uncontrolled medical tests. It would be up to practicing doctors
to determine which, among a vast number of drugs purported to treat or cure a given
terminal illness, might be most eective for their patients, and to determine the
point at which it should be concluded that a given drug does not work.
Even worse, as the Laetrile court also feared, the availability of new and
unapproved drugs might cause patients, sometimes with the consent of their doctors,
to put o conventional medical treatment. As the Court remarked, if an individual
suering from a potentially fatal disease rejects conventional therapy in favor of a
drug with no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible
Rutherford at 2477. While doctors would not become desensitized to taking human
life in the way that they would if they were authorized to assist in their patients'
suicides, they might very well become more careless about how they treat human life.
The nal problem that the Glucksberg court brings up with respect to allowing
assisted suicide is the fact that, even if we were to justify the act on a theoretical level,
it would be practically impossible to conne the incidence of it to the narrow situations
for which it would be authorized. For reasons I outlined in the beginning of the paper,
I believe that this concern is justied. Again, how we do we dene terminal? How we
can assess whether someone is in unbearable pain? The rst of these
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54questions presents the biggest problem for the proposition that the rights of the
terminally-ill should be evaluated as a discrete matter: how do we dene the extension
of terminally|ill and how do we ensure that our test will be strictly applied?
Clearly, this concern applies to my topic as much as it does to that of assisted
suicide, as the common nexus of the concepts is that they both concern the terminally-
ill. Since the Glucksberg Court laid a lot of emphasis on these types of denitional
concerns in reasoning to its rejection of the right to assisted suicide, then what would
make it change its mind if asked to recognized the right to stay alive?
My answer to this question is twofold. One, I do not believe that it is as dicult
as the Court implies to x an extension to the class of people for whom assisted
suicide would be an option. While I agree that it would be hard to come up with a
strict and formal mechanism for dening terminally|ill, I believe that we all have an
intuition as to what should properly fall under that heading and what should
not. Of course, our analysis of whether a particular person is terminally-ill
could rest only on actuals, rather than hypotheticals, lest we would never be
able to apply the label. (It would be impractical and self|defeating to factor in
possibilities such as the chance of a sudden cure, which though possible would
rid many diseases of their terminal character) However, I believe that an appeal
to our ordinary, everyday usage of the term, which takes only realistic contingencies
into account, would point us in the right direction. To give an example, Oregon
has resolved the issue by conning its statute authorizing physician-assisted
suicide to adult(s) of sound mind who ha(ve] been given less than six months
to live in the opinion of two doctors. 25
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55Thus, in deciding whether an individual should be granted the right to obtain assisted
suicide or the right to have special access to medication, our common understand-
ing of the term terminally| ill, should be able to serve as a useful and likely
sucient guide. The problem of semantic open-endedness is not exclusive to
the usage of the description terminally|ill, but is present each time we use
language to formulate any rule or law. As a problem that we cannot escape,
it is one that we have learned to deal with. I do not believe that the inherent
vagueness and ambiguities of language present a great enough threat to justify
abandoning the recognition of important rights.
Even if we were able to conne laws relating to the terminally-ill on a theo-
retical level, however, there remains the concern that aording special treatment
to the terminally|ill in narrowly prescribed circumstances will lead in practice
to an innite regression. The Glucksberg court feared that allowing the option of
assisted suicide to certain people under certain circumstances would promote similar,
but more serious, types of restricted behavior. As evidence, the court pointed
to the situation in the Netherlands, where legalization of assisted suicide has
resulted in increased and uncontrolled instances of voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia, Glucksberg at 2274. Taken to an extreme, any leaning in the direc-
tion of assisted suicide could begin to erode society's moral repugnance towards
taking the lives of others.
While this specic consequence would not be entailed by allowing terminal
individuals access to unapproved drugs, an analogous concern does arise. While
granting the right to live would not harden society and doctors towards the
taking of human lives, it could lead to a state of aairs equally capable of
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56getting out of control. As I mentioned above, once doctors are allowed to provide
their patients with unapproved medication, it will be hard for them to draw the line
between cases that do and do not warrant this type of special treatment. If a doctor
sees that a given unapproved drug is having benecial eects on a terminally-ill
patient, he will likely be inclined to want to test the drug on patients with similar, but
maybe not terminal, illnesses. Equally, he might get so used to treating patients
with unapproved drugs that he will forego more conventional treatment for his
patients, when maybe the latter would be more appropriate.
Additionally, there is potential for the situation to become unraveled on
a broader level. While a law allowing special access to medication would be
narrowly prescribed to apply only to terminally-ill individuals who suer from a
disease for which no eective cure exists, it would inevitably open the door to all
kinds of claims from anyone from whom important drugs are being denied or
delayed. Equally, it would be susceptible to the type of equal protection challenges
enunciated in Quill, as it would grant some people the right to unapproved drugs while
denying the right from others. Thus, the Supreme Court might be wary again to
go down that road; for once the ball gets rolling in a certain direction, it is always
hard to stop it. I believe that this fear was at the base of the Supreme Court's
decision to rule against the Glucksberg respondents and its strong disinclination
even to recognize the right to die as a right at all.
Thus, we see that, while it might be possible to establish the right to stay
alive as one worthy of constitutional protection, it would still be up against a
myriad of serious objections. Most of these objections, such as the question of
competency, the potential for nancial and/or emotional coercion, the possibil-
ity that the
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57ethics of the medical profession would be compromised, the concern that less-than-
healthy individuals would believe their lives were being judged as less valuable than
others, and the problem of conning the right both theoretically and practically
were brought up in essence by the Glucksberg court to support its rejection of the
right to assisted suicide. We have seen how they apply if not in a specic, at
least in a general sense, to allowing terminally-ill individuals access to unapproved
medication as well.
The other objections which I hypothesized and/or abstracted from actual
discussions regarding the right of the terminally|ill to have access to unapproved
drugs are the possibility that unapproved drugs may actually worsen a patient's
already|grave condition and the concern that patients and doctors will decide
to forego conventional treatment in favor of experimenting with unapproved
drugs. While I have concluded that each of these actual and possible objec-
tions should be taken seriously, I believe that most of them are capable of being
overcome by legitimate counterarguments. Although I agree that determining a
patient's competency is not an easy matter, it is one that must be dealt with all
the time where the paths of law and medicine cross. True, a patient suering
from a terminal illness will likely be in a particularly vulnerable and/or desperate
state, but maybe the desperation that surrounds the situation should not be ex-
cluded from benet/risk analysis. Equally, we do not have the specic concern
regarding the right to stay alive, as we do with respect to assisted suicide, that
patients granted the right will be in danger of being driven to exercise the right
by an independent medical condition such as clinical depression. That specic
objection is not relevant to situations where the right to stay alive would arise.
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58Alternatively, it might be possible to circumvent the competency problem by pro-
viding for a living|will type document in which a patient would decide before his
illness advanced whether he would be willing to try unapproved but potentially
life-saving drugs. Finally, even if an incorrect assumption were made as to a
patient's competency, and he were allowed to exercise his right to stay alive where
'normally' he would not have, the consequence will almost certainly not be as grave
as that which an exercise of the right to die would entail. Again, it is unlikely
that unapproved drugs will cause death.
The concern of potential nancial coercion, I take to be essentially inapplica-
ble to situation at hand. However, I do believe that the possibility for emotional
coercion presents a serious concern, and may actually compromise the personal
autonomy which the right sets out to protect. Again, however, I do not be-
lieve that the potential for such coercion outweighs the benet that would be derived
from granting the patients the right to stay alive. I base this conclusion on two
considerations.
First, I nd it factually unlikely that there will be too many instances in
which a terminally-ill individual will be resistant to using unapproved medica-
tions, but where his loved ones would nonetheless insist on promoting it. As
we have seen, terminally|ill individuals are ghting bitterly and vigorously for
access to unapproved drugs. I stand by the concern, however, that those who
do not want the choice may feel pressured by its existence.
Secondly, however, I believe that the potential for emotional coercion is just
as great, if not greater, with respect to Cruzan situations. Clearly, opting to
be kept alive indenitely by a respirator, when the option to die naturally is
available, may seem
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59selsh to a person faced with the decision. Everyone knows that the former option
would cause serious emotional and nancial burdens to the individual's family and
friends. However, the Cruzan Court saw the right at stake there to be more
important than the competing possibility of nancial and/or emotional coercion.
The same goes for the competency question discussed directly above, and
the concern regarding the negative implications which granting the rights to
live or to die might have on the ethics of the medical profession and/or society
in general. All of these concerns were equally, if not more, applicable to the
question of whether the Cruzan-type right to die should be honored. By the
Supreme Court's positive decision in that case, however, we can infer that they
were all apparently outweighed by the Court's belief in the validity and importance
of the right.
Thus, although I stated before that establishing a right as fundamental is
only half the formal battle of having it constitutionally-recognized under a sub-
stantive due process claim, realistically I believe that it is where the battle is
truly won. Almost all of the objections that the court raised against allowing as-
sisted suicide would apply to allowing refusal of or withdrawal from life-support.
The only dierence is that the latter is a right which the Court saw as worthy of
mandatory constitutional protection, while the former was one which it was re-
luctant to recognize. If we interpret the spectrum of life|and|death decisions
in the way that I suggested earlier, and take into consideration the societal and
constitutional trends that have ensued since the time of the Laetrile decision, it
would seem that the Court should be more psychologically inclined to accept the
right to stay alive than any type of right to die, whether the latter be exercised
actively or passively.
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60So what about the objections that would not likely have been raised with respect to the
Cruzan right to die? These are the diculty that would arise in attempting to conne
and contain the right in question, in the practical sense that I described above,
and the related concern that patients would exercise and doctors would comply with
the right too liberally. Because the Cruzan right pertains to fairly well|dened
situations, line|drawing is not too big a threat to its stability. A patient's decision
with respect to whether he wants to be resuscitated or put on a respirator is not easy
to misunderstand. Equally, if we disregard the possibility of fraud or coercion,
there are not too many situations in which the right could be taken advantage of. For
these reasons, it was easier to grant the Cruzan-type of right to die without worrying
that it would get out of control.
Though the concern that the right to stay alive, if honored, might be taken advan-
tage of is not one that we can brush aside, I believe that the number of instances
in which it would actually be abused would be far lower than the number of in-
stances in which it would be properly and benecially exercised. Although incentives
other than purely their patients' best interests do motivate doctors' decisions, the
interests of doctors and patients, though maybe for dierent reasons, actually
coincide at most junctures. Thus, whether a doctor is motivated by a genuine and
heartfelt concern for his patient's well|being, or by a desire to strengthen his rep-
utation and attract additional patients, or both, the outcome will be probably
the same: he will want to take the course of action that will prove most successful
for the patient's health. Thus, while there would be a number of legitimate gov-
ernment interests against granting the right to stay alive, it seems that, in light
of the Court's 1990 Cruzan decision, they are not
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61insurmountable, nor compelling enough to cause the right to be denied. Again, if the
right were to be recognized as fundamental, the relevant interests would have to
weigh quite heavily in favor of the government in order for the government to be
allowed to pass a statute which abridges the right. Equally, while it would be naive
to suggest that the government would have no legitimate reason to want to curb the
right to stay alive, I believe that any potential societal harm which granting the
right to stay alive would entail would be considerably less than might follow from
allowing any type of right to die, even the of the constitutionally|mandated Cruzan
type.
Beyond raising objections that could be analogized to the right to stay alive,
the Glucksberg opinion is useful in bringing to light a number of reasons why,
in the Court's own language, the right to stay alive should be recognized. In my
next section, I will discuss some reasons why the Supreme Court might actively want
to honor the right to stay alive, which can be inferred from its discussion of its
reluctance to honor the right to assisted suicide. While in this section, my goal was to
show that the right to stay alive is capable of withstanding objections regarding the
potential societal harm that it might entail, I will use my next section to discuss
the potential societal benets that would accompany the right, as implied by the
Court's own reasoning in the right-to-die cases.
An Argument for the Right to Stay Alive Based on Arguments Against
The Right to Die
In my rst section, in which I discussed the relationship between the right to die
and the right to stay alive, I concluded
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that would tolerate acceptance of the latter. My general point was that, if we are
willing to honor personal autonomy to the extent that we are willing to let people
take (or omit) certain actions that will result in death; and if we are moving in
the direction of actually allowing people to take their own lives prematurely, then
certainly we have the requisite philosophical framework to justify giving people who
are about to die the option of taking drugs intended to save their lives.
After concluding on this basis that the right to stay alive is at least one
that should be constitutionally|recognized, I 'balanced' it against hypotheti-
cal competing government interests that would likely be raised against it. While
I derived some of the possible objections to the right to live from common sense
and from everyday life, I imported most of them from actual discussions of
the right of the terminally-ill to have access to unapproved medication and the
Supreme Court's balancing test discussion in Glucksberg. My purpose was to
evaluate whether the particular nature of the right to stay alive would distin-
guish it enough from the right to die to enable it to withstand the objections to
which the Supreme Court believed physician-assisted suicide succumbed. For
this reason, I mentioned only those arguments from the Glucksberg opinion that
I believed were relevant, either directly or by analogy, to right to live situations.
On the whole, I concluded that, while many of the concerns that arise in the
context of the right to die are applicable to the right to stay alive, the negative
societal impacts would be less serious and less certain in situations involving
the right to stay alive. Thus, the relevant objections, though not unfounded,
would not carry as much weight
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63against the right to stay alive as they do against the right to assisted suicide.
To lend more support to my argument that the right to stay alive might
be able to overcome competing government interests if formulated as such and
challenged on due process grounds, I will now discuss several arguments made
against assisted suicide which not only are not transferable to the concept of
the right to stay alive, but actually support it by a kind of negative implication. I
will attempt to show how several of the Supreme Court's arguments against the
right to assisted suicide actually imply a societal and constitutional acceptance
of the right to stay alive.
I mentioned briey that the Glucksberg majority concludes that the right to die
- or as they phrase it the right to commit suicide and have assistance in doing
so | is not one that is even constitutionally|recognized. Again, the majority
reaches this conclusion on the basis that the right is not one which can be located
in history or tradition. To prove this, the majority embarks on a lengthy discussion
of the evils of regular suicide and the vehement eorts made throughout history
to prevent it. The Court points out that suicide used to be illegal, and was
legalized only for the protection of the people which the suicide left behind.
Thus, the Court concludes that the right which the Glucksberg respondents seek is
not constitutionally recognized, no less constitutionally required.
Although the Glucksberg Court mischaracterizes - or at least characterizes to
its advantage - the right in question to emphasis its relationship to regular suicide,
its underlying point is not illegitimate. It is true that the values underlying
historical eorts to prevent suicide are somewhat in discord with those that
would underlie allowing physician-assisted suicide. It is probably
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64true that most of us would not want to make the general statement that suicide
is okay. Nor would we want to condone a law that allows a doctor, even with
the patient's consent, to enable a patient to take his own life.
It is this intuition which the Glucksberg majority captures in its rst argu-
ment against allowing assisted suicide, namely that the state has an overwhelm-
ing interest in preserving human life. While the counterargument for this in
the context of assisted suicide would be that situations involving terminally-ill
individuals are distinguishable by type, proponents of the right to stay alive
would not even have to go that far. Instead, the very legitimate intuition that
we want at all costs to preserve human life is already a very forceful argument
in favor of the right to stay alive.
While assisted suicide, and the Cruzan type of right to die, allow behavior
counter to both our intuitions and our general societal goals, honoring the right
to stay alive would not only be in accord with but would actively support this
goal. People who seek unapproved drugs are asking for one last chance to try to
live. They, and their proponents, are clinging to the instinct to preserve life even
in the face of the most dire and hopeless circumstances. Ironically, everything
which believers of the right to die stand for, believers in the right to stay alive
stand against. Rather than giving up on life, they want to ght as hard as they
can, and use whatever means possible, to stay alive. How then can we, a society
purportedly committed to preserving human life, justify denying them the right
to try to save their lives? How can the government interest in preserving life be
strong enough to justify prohibiting people suering from unbearable pain from
taking their doomed lives even slightly prematurely, but not be strong enough
to
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65protect people's eorts to try to stay alive? How can we let the FDA engage in active
behavior (e.g. its lengthy review process) that will necessarily result in at least some
unnecessary human deaths, while we deny the right to the terminally-ill on exactly
this basis? Sure, we are allowed to refuse or be withdrawn from life-support; but the
Court could not even bring itself to recognize this as a right of personal choice.
Rather, it felt the need to characterize it as a kind of idiosyncratic implication
of a historical common law rule.
The point is that the Supreme Court, and most likely society at large, is
extremely disinclined to admit that allowing a person to choose to die is ever
okay, whether the person himself concurs in the decision or not. It goes against
all of our philosophical, ethical, religious, scientic etc. beliefs. The goal is
always to try to nd new ways to enable people to live longer. By the Supreme
Court's own terms, then, it should be nothing less than admirable | and by
the same reasoning necessary | to allow people to try any method they choose to
preserve their lives. The people we are talking about are going to die soon anyway;
they do not have to be protected from imminent death. What they are asking
for, and what it would only be natural to grant them, is the right to try to stay
alive.
The Glucksberg Court points out the eorts that have traditionally been and
continue to be made to prevent people from taking their own lives. From that,
it should follow that people have not only the right, but the responsibility, not
to let themselves die. The Court also emphasizes the state's overwhelming interest
in preserving human life. From that it should follow that the government should
allow people all means possible to preserve their own lives. Thus, the right to
stay alive presents a unique situation. Unlike other
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66asserted rights, such as the various types of rights to die or the right to abortion, some
of which have been deemed weighty enough to overcome the government's primary
interest in preserving life 26, the right to stay alive actually embraces this interest
itself. It is true that there are safety concerns associated with allowing terminally-ill
individuals access to unapproved drugs, but, again, because they are terminally-
ill, the people who would be aorded this right do not have much to lose. Clearly,
there is a point where an unreviewed - and so potentially unsafe - drug is more
likely to be constructive than destructive in its eects. This point cannot be dened
abstractly and absolutely, but must be identied on a case-by|case basis with
reference to the intended recipient of the drug. If the harm which the drug
might produce is less grave than the conditions under which the recipient is
already living - or, conversely, if the good which the unapproved might do is greater
than the harm which it might cause | then the logic of an argument based on
a concern for health and safety deteriorates.
Thus, granting the right to stay alive is entirely consistent with the interest in
preserving life. Hence, the right can nd grounding not only in theories such as privacy,
personal autonomy, bodily integrity etc., which have been used to defeat relevant
government interests, but it has the additional force of actually standing for
the signicant government interest to which other important rights have been
opposed, e.g. that of preserving life.
Along the same lines, the Court also fears that allowing assisted suicide
would compromise the role of doctor as healer. The worry is that patients and
society in general might lose faith in doctors and question their motives, if doctors are
willing to participate in helping patients take their lives. As the traditional role
of the physician is to help a patient stay alive,
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67it would be hard to justify allowing doctors under any circumstances to help patients
end their lives. The idea is that it is counterintuitive for a doctor not to take steps
to help a patient survive. Hence, we have the disinclination displayed on the part
of courts to enforce the Cruzan right to die, even though that right is constitutionally
required. In this light, it would only stand to reason that doctors be allowed to
treat patients with any and all drugs that prolong their patients' lives. If a
patient's condition is rapidly deteriorating, then there is no time to wait for
FDA approval. Plus, the patients are asking to be saved.
It seems that a doctor's inability to provide patients with drugs that could po-
tentially save their lives would be a viable basis on which patients could begin to
lose faith in their doctors. It is not so much that patients would doubt their doctors'
motives, for clearly it would not be a doctor's fault if he was legally prohibited from
providing them with medication. It is more that the patient would begin to see his
doctor as powerless, and so begin to lose hope himself. Some patients who suer
from terminal conditions look at doctors as gods. Even though they might remain
condent that their doctors want to help, it is hard to see someone whom you depend
on and look to for solutions in a helpless situation. The terminally|ill are aware
that there are medications out there which might be successful in saving their lives
but that these drugs are discouragingly just beyond their doctors' reach.
So, we have the Supreme Court upholding statutes that prohibit doctors from
assisting their patients end lives of unbearable pain and suering. We have
courts that are loath to uphold 'legally valid' documents ordering the withdrawal
of life|support. Yet, we allow people to die who are dying to live, where steps
could be taken which might successfully save them. That doctors are
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68restricted from taking any measures which in their medical judgment might amelio-
rate a patient's already-terminal condition seems completely and totally inconsistent
not only with our traditional conception of the doctor as healer, but with our legal
and judicial attitudes towards the goal of the medical profession.
Thus, the very points raised by the Supreme Court to explain its rejection of
the right to die could be easily used to support an argument for the right to stay
alive. Although my last section showed that the right to stay alive was susceptible to
several of the arguments made against the right to die, this section shows that, by the
Court's own reasoning, allowing the right to stay alive would comport with some
very fundamental and important societal goals. While there might be some
legitimate government interests that run counter to granting the right to stay alive,
these would likely be far less weighty than the very compelling government interests
which the right embraces and which in turn necessitate the right. Hence, we have
further evidence that, if formulated as such, the right to stay alive should be worthy
of constitutional protection.
Administrative vs. Constitutional Challenges
Throughout this paper, I have been arguing that the terminally|ill comprise
a special class of people deserving of special treatment; because they face dierent
questions and alternatives than the rest of us face, they should be subject to
dierent standards. I have argued that rights aecting the terminally|ill qua
being terminally-ill (e.g. those involving life and death decisions( should be decided
in a class of their own. On the basis of this reasoning, I have contended that the
question of whether terminally-ill individuals should have special access to
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69unapproved medication is inappropriately, though incidentally, placed within the ju-
risdiction of the Food and Drug Administration. As I have mentioned, I believe that
the issue should be abstracted from tre administrative context in which it cur-
rently arises and analysed on its own terms as a separate legal and philosophical
question. Along these lines, I attempted to outline what a hypothetical substan-
tive due process claim of what I have called the right to stay alive might look
like, importing into my analysis constitutional discussions from Supreme Court
opinions concerning the analogous right to die. From this analysis, I concluded
that based on its own reasoning in Cruzan, Glucksberg and Quill, the Supreme
Court should be committed to recognizing the right to stay alive as one wor-
thy of constitutional protection. even contended that the right, because of the
important and fundamental societal interests which it embraces and promotes,
would have a good chance of withstanding competing government interests that
would be launched against it as objections.
In spite of all of this, the terminally|ill continue to appeal directly to FDA
to have their right to stay alive recognized. This may be because they take the
1979 Laetrile case to have been dispositive of any constitutional claims along
these lines. As the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issues
alluded to in the Laetrile case directly, however, I do not believe that it would be
committed to denying that the terminally-ill have constitutional rights at stake
with respect to whether they should be given access to unapproved medications,
that override the rules laid down by the FDA. Indeed, FDA - which is currently
in the position of makings rules that aect an innitely diverse group of people
living under innitely dierent circumstances - might even be grateful to have
this question taken o its hands. If the
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70right to stay alive was determined to be constitutionally|required, FDA would have
no choice but to except terminally|ill people from the reach of its approval process
rules.
That would work best for everyone involved; that is, if the Supreme Court
did in fact look at the issue as I have hypothesized it would in light of its later
Cruzan decision and current societal pressure towards an acceptance of the right
to die. Even if the terminally-ill had a chance of winning the right to stay alive, no
one could guarantee the outcome of a constitutional challenge. So, would there
be a point in pushing the question into a constitutional forum? As I mentioned
at the beginning of the paper, steps have been and are being taken under the
current system to accommodate the rights of the terminally-ill with respect to
unapproved drugs. The FDA has responded to cancer and AIDS lobbies. It has
already made a number of concessions and seems open to further suggestions. In
fact, there is currently a bill proposed for the 105th Congress concerning Medical
Access Rights of the Terminally Ill which would further accommodate the right of
the terminally|ill to obtain unapproved medication. Is it worth upsetting a
process that is already moving in the right direction for only a possible victory?
In that context, the answer does not seem as clear.
To avoid being guilty of begging the question that the right to unapproved drugs
is one that should be constitutionally challenged as opposed to being left to the
FDA, I would like to take a moment to expand on the analysis I proposed earlier
to support this premise. The most obvious argument for removing the question
of what drugs terminally|ill individuals should and should not have access to
from the jurisdiction of the FDA is that decisions of that magnitude are simply
too important and personal to be decided by an administrative agency established to
address a whole gamut of
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71issues. Although individuals who seek special access to unapproved drugs can
and have petitioned the legislature directly for help with their cause, the demand
always concerns revisions and modications of FDA's policies. The question is
always clouded by administrative concerns.
It is not as easy as just saying, okay certain people can have access to certain
drugs. FDA must t this exception into its general rules, and draw lines around
it rigid enough to keep out every other category of people and drugs over which
it has jurisdiction. It is not free to consider the problem from an objective
and absolute perspective. It must answer the question strategically, under the
weight and inuence of a number of other forces.
The very function which FDA was established to execute, namely to protect
people from potentially unsafe food, drugs, cosmetics and devices, is inherently
paternalistic. It is FDA's job to make sure that products on the market are
safe for human consumption or use, and it is FDA which is held accountable
if these products turn out not to be safe. The very exhaustive and rigorous
review process to which it subjects new drugs, food, cosmetics etc. illustrates
a philosophy on its part that a new drug etc. will be considered unsafe until
proven safe. Because of the nature of its duties, however, it must act defensively
in this area. Despite the inconvenience of having to wait a little or even a lot
longer for certain products to enter the market, most would probably agree that
in the normal course of events it is better to be safe than sorry.
The dierence with terminally-ill individuals is that their situations do not
represent the normal course of events. They do not have the time to wait. The
choice for them is not between safe" and sorry", but rather between potentially
unsafe or
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72denitely sorry. As the slogan on the ALS web page says, the terminally-ill do
not want to be protected to death. Thus, their situations and entitlements must
be evaluated according to a whole dierent set of rules. I mentioned earlier that
the FDA has jurisdiction over a whole range of decisions, from the trivial to the
very serious; the questions raised by situations involving the terminally-ill are
not only of a dierent degree, but of a dierent type as well.
FDA does not have the time and resources to deal with the ethical ques-
tions inherent in this type of decision|making. Even if it wanted to allow the
terminally-ill access to certain unapproved drugs, it would have to characterize
this allowance as an exception to its general rules. It could not recognize the
rights of the terminally-ill as rights, lest it undermine the validity of its protective
and paternalistic function with respect to all other people under its jurisdiction.
After all, if people have the right to choose what they will and will not put into
their bodies, then no one and no decision concerning the ingestion of food or
drugs should be subject to the discretion of the FDA.
It is precisely for this reason that the terminally|ill should be recognized
as comprising a special class whose rights are evaluated as a discrete matter.
It is under the category of rights of the terminally|ill where both types of
right to die and the right to stay alive intersect and where they should most
appropriately be evaluated. Sure, all of these rights possess predicates other
than 'that they aect the terminally-ill' . The right to die is often linked with
the right to abortion, in the more general sense that they both 'pertain to
intimate decisions aecting the body' . And, as it stands now, the question of
whether the terminally|ill should have access to unapproved drugs is
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73legitimately described as a 'food and drug' issue. In my opinion, however, the most
essential feature of all of these rights is that they involve life-and-death decisions
faced by people for whom death is imminent. For that reason, it should be this
characteristic that sets both the interior and exterior limits of the class to which
they most appropriately belong. That way, the context in which they are analysed
will be neither too narrow nor too broad.
The context that surrounds FDA decision-making will inevitably be too broad,
as FDA has only the latitude to make distinctions between types of drug; it
cannot distinguish between recipients of the drugs under its jurisdiction on the basis
of a philosophical rights analysis. And it should not have to. FDA cannot aord
to be concerned with the question of whether it is morally correct to give the
terminally|ill the chance to save themselves; it must concern itself with acting
in accordance with its established function, namely to protect all people from
potentially unsafe products. Thus, asking FDA to answer this moral question
would be asking it to make a decision about which it must by its very nature be
biased. This is not fair to either the agency or to the people whom its decision
aects.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's function not only allows it to but
requires it to evaluate rights as rights, and to consider the nature of the person
or group asserting these rights. Sure, the FDA may, at its own discretion or by
force from the legislature, make some compromises in this area. If the right to
stay alive were deemed worthy of constitutional protection, however, the battle
would be conclusively won. It would not be a step|bystep process. It would
not be subject to change or reconsideration. Instead, it would allow terminally-
ill individuals access to the potentially life|saving drugs they so desperately
seek, not as a
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74matter of administrative grace, but as a matter of fundamental right. After all,
people falling under the category of terminallyill do not have time cut through
red-tape.
As idyllic as this all sounds, however, there is no way to tell whether the
Supreme Court would nd the right to stay alive to be worthy of constitutional
protection. Throughout the paper, I have assumed that the Supreme Court's
wariness of allowing physician-assisted suicide as opposed to its more favorable
response to allowing the refusal of life-support was at base driven by an intuitive
sense that the latter just seems more morally okay. I attributed this intuition to
the instinct shared by most of us that human life should be preserved whenever
possible; that the more a given act accords with an intention to die, as opposed
to an intention to live, the worse it is and the less it should be encouraged.
Though I cannot read the minds of the Justices who comprised the Glucksberg and
Quill majorities, it seems more likely that this moral instinct was responsible for
the discrepancy between Court's treatment of the two types of asserted rights
to die than the fact that the Cruzan right could be traced to a common law rule
of battery. On the basis of this reasoning, I assumed that the Supreme Court
would approach an analysis of the right to stay alive from a more psychologically
favorable perspective. Equally, I concluded that the detrimental impacts on
society which the Supreme Court genuinely feared would ow from allowing
assisted suicide, though relevant to allowing terminally-ill individuals access to
unapproved drugs, were either distinguishable or did not pose as a great of a risk in
the latter case. However, either my assumption regarding the Court's underlying
motivations, or my hypothesis regarding how it might balance the right to stay
alive against competing government interests, or both, could be wrong.
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75If that were the case, then clearly proponents of the right to stay alive would be much
better o pursuing the course which they are currently pursuing. Certainly, it
would not help their position with the FDA if the Supreme Court were to declare
that their right to unapproved medication is not one that is constitutionally-
protected, or is outweighed by competing government interests. Perhaps, trying
to reform the FDA's procedures, though more tenuous on a long-term basis, is
the safer way to go, especially in light of FDA's favorable response to societal
pressure to loosen its standards for the terminally|ill. Also, the FDA is allowed
to respond to societal and political pressure in a direct way that Supreme Court
is not. Thus, one reason why the right to stay alive has not been formulated
and asserted as such might be that the downside of having a Supreme Court
decision directly against it, in addition to the Laetrile case, would not be worth
risking. Beyond this practical reason, however, there might be another strategic
reason to keep the question within the jurisdiction to the
FDA.
Earlier I argued that, because of the seriousness of this question and the ethical
issues that surround it, an administrative agency should not have jurisdiction over
it. As a sort of correlative counterargument, however, one might contend for the
very same reason that it should be left within FDA's jurisdiction. My earlier
contention was based on a belief that issues of great magnitude and ethical
importance should not be evaluated within the constraints of an administrative
setting, especially one that is bogged down with such a broad spectrum of issues.
It might be countered, however, that the clinical and technical atmosphere of an
administrative agency is just the place where volatile and sensitive questions should
be decided; not because this type of setting is
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not. One of the reasons I chose to compare my topic to the right to die is because
both are currently very hot and much|debated issues. This is so because both
deal with excruciatingly important and personal decisions whose consequences are
of life-and-death proportions.
As sensitive as these issues are, however, they are equally explosive, with
vehement proponents standing rm on either side. Thus, it is not likely that
anyone would want to be in the position of making substantive judgments about
their merits. In fact, the sheer volatility of the issue of physician|assisted sui-
cide may have been another motivating force behind the Court's rather odd
treatment of it. Again, while the Glucksberg majority was quick to deny the sub-
stance of respondents' asserted right, it felt compelled in any case to go on to
perform quite a substantive analysis of the right; while it ultimately denied the
right unqualied constitutional protection, it also encouraged debate over the
issue at the state level; while the decision was unanimous, there were many
concurrences.
The point is that pushing issues that are too hot to handle into environments
that will extinguish rather than fan their res might actually be a good strategic
move. It could even have been that the Glucksberg and Quill Courts thought it
made sense and/or was even morally appealing to allow terminally|ill people
suering from unbearable and unrelenting pain the option of ending their lives
with whatever dignity has not already been taken away; nonetheless, the Court
could understandably have been reluctant to take the step of construing our
constitution as embracing the substantive ethical position that it is okay to
engage in an act of self|destruction. Similarly, it might be more psychologically
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77dicult for the Court to give terminally-ill individuals - who are already in a weak and
vulnerable state - the 'choice' of whether to take potentially dangerous medication,
than it would be for the FDA change or loosen its administrative procedures for certain
exceptional cases.
This is not necessarily because FDA would not be motivated by the same substan-
tive ethical considerations. It might believe in the moral correctness of the move; or it
might be motivated by the force of societal pressure, or both. The point is that,
whatever its motivations might be, it would not have to spell them out as would
the Supreme Court. The issue would merely have to be decided rather than hav-
ing to be evaluated. Equally, an exception made by FDA would not be as nal, nor
would its implications be as important or vast, as a decision handed down by the
Court. FDA could decide to allow terminally-ill patients access to potentially
life|saving drugs on a trial or an experimental basis. Its decision would not be
taken to set a potentially far|reaching precedent. Thus, it is not unreasonable to
take the view that volatile issues might be better received in settings that allow a
decision to be made in favor of these issues without forcing a major statement
to be made.
One might say that this view was tested in the case of Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1988), in which prisoners who had been sentenced
to death by Oklahoma and Texas state courts attempted to have FDA enjoined
to intervene in their executions. The theory was that the use of drugs for lethal in-
jection to eect the death penalty contravened the FD&C Act, both as an instance
of misbranding and as an unauthorized use of a new drug.
According to the rst theory, use of drugs for lethal injections violated the mis-
branding provision (352(f)) of the FD&C
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78Act, which prohibits unapproved use of approved drugs. As the drugs in question
had not been approved for the purpose of being used in lethal injections, the FDA
should hold prisons in violation of the statute for using the drugs to eect executions.
Alternatively, the prisoners argued that the drugs should actually be considered
new drugs, because the purpose for which they would be used is not the one
for which they were originally intended. Under this theory, the drugs would be
subjected to the long and tortuous review and approval process, which I described
in the beginning of the paper.
The prisoners' plan did not work. The decision turned primarily on questions
of administrative law. The Supreme Court held that FDA's decision not to take
enforcement measures along the lines that the prisoners suggested was presump-
tively unreviewable, and that the particular circumstances of the case did not
undermine that presumption. Somewhat reminiscent of the Laetrile case, the
Court did not really reach the issue of whether it would or would not be appro-
priate for FDA to intervene in the administration of issues such as the death
penalty. The only analysis to this eect was oered by the FDA Commissioner
himself, who expressed that, even if the agency did technically have jurisdiction
in the area, it might not be appropriate for it to interfere with this particular
aspect of the criminal justice system, Chaney at 824.
On the basis of the same reasoning asserted by the prisoners in the Chaney
case - and coming full circle | one might try to push the issue of assisted suicide
into the jurisdiction of the FDA as well. One might argue that the pills which
doctors would supply to terminally-ill patients to assist them in ending their
lives are being used for an unapproved use. Or, along the same lines, one might
argue that FDA could nally be the one to stop the everacquitted Dr. Kevorkian
from using his suicide machine | an
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79intravenous machine which administers lethal drugs 27 | on the basis that his
usage of it in assisting patients' suicides constitutes an unapproved use of a human
medical device according to section 360 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. Equally, as the prisoners in Chaney argued, one could contend that this
suicide machine is misbranded as the intravenous device is not labeled as being
designed for the purpose of putting people to death.
These would certainly be cases of cutting the ethical underpinnings of hugely
volatile issues o at their roots. Equally, if FDA were to decide to disapprove
the uses of the above| mentioned drugs or medical devices, it would eectively
insulate the issue from moral attack. That is not to say that opponents of the
decision would not assert ethical arguments against it; but rather that any
moral objections would lose their force and relevancy when posed against a
purportedly 'non-ethical' decision.
Opponents would have to resort to a dierent line of attack to be able to
defeat the decision on its own terms. This task would not be impossible, or even
dicult. Clearly, the statutory question of whether either the use of drugs for
lethal injection or the use of intravenous machines for euthanasia violated the
FD&C Act would turn on an interpretation of the word use. Those who supported
the death penalty or assisted suicide would surely be able to come up with
interpretations of the language of the FD&C Act broad enough so that it could
reasonably be construed as permitting the particular uses in question. For
instance, one could argue that intravenous devices were designed for the purpose
of administering drugs to human beings in liquid form. As Dr. Kevorkian uses
his machine for that immediate purpose, it is irrelevant what his ultimate goal
may be. In fact, identifying the
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80use of a medi cal device by its ultimate purpose could at the outer limits yield quite
absurd results.
If Dr. Kevorkian's use of the machine constituted a new use, would the use of
devices as innocuous as I.V. machines in the course of treatment for every new
disease constitute a new use of the device? Would doctors or hospitals have to clear
it with FDA every time they used an I.V. machine in any dierent course of
treatment? Would every surgical instrument, for instance, have to be approved
for use in every type of operation for which it is needed? Certainly, there is
a dierence between the immediate or primary purpose for which a drug or
medical device is designed and the ultimate purpose which it may be employed
to eect. In any case, the point is that, regardless of what types of technical
and semantic statutory arguments might or might not be made, the placement
of controversial ethical issues under the jurisdiction of the FDA would certainly
change the tone of the debate over these issues from what it is now. It might be
strategically sound to attempt to have an ethical viewpoint implemented on the
basis of an essentially unrelated technicality, if it worked. This would be like
convicting Maa gures for tax evasion because we cannot and are scared to
get them for anything else. However, my personal opinion remains that this
indirect type of approach is for the most part inappropriate.
In general, I believe that issues that are ready and meant to be decided
favorably will be decided favorably in their appropriate settings. If the risks
which they pose for individuals and/or society are shown to outweigh the bene-
ts, then maybe it is correct to decide against them at the current stage of the
game. Of course, we run the risk that the somewhat arbitrary nature of due
process balancing tests makes them susceptible to bias, or even misjudgment.
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81However, a system that balances philosophical and ethical concerns a little un-
scientically must be better than one that does not (explicitly) balance them at all.
Pushing ethical decisions into administrative settings masks, rather than extinguishes,
substantive moral judgments. The decision will be just as morally-motivated,
only it will illegitimately be insulated from direct moral attack. Even on a com-
mon sense level, would we really want the Food and Drug Administration making
decisions about capital punishment? Wouldn't we feel more comfortable, whether
we agree with the ultimate decision or not, knowing that the question of whether
there should or should not be capital punishment was decided in a setting de-
signed precisely to consider that type of decision?
Of course, whenever there is an issue about which one feels strongly, one
cannot help but hope instinctively that it be decided in favor of one's view, even
if it means that the decision has to be made on the basis of a technicality.
Speaking in the abstract though, most would probably appreciate that, while
they would like the end result of having a decision in their favor based on
inessential considerations, they would feel uncomfortable with the means of
arriving there.
As a general rule, I do not believe that important decisions should be made
on the basis of unrelated technicalities. However, I might be able to justify an
exception to the rule when and only when there is no other way for the right
decision to be reached. After all, I do believe that it would be better to convict
Maa gures of tax evasion than to not be able to convict them at all. However,
this type of reasoning is clearly heavily value|laden, as few would admit that
a view which they advance was wrong. This might explain my inclination to
want the right to stay alive to be advocated on its merits. After my hypothetical
analysis of the right, I
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82concluded that the right to stay alive is one worth honoring, as long as it does
not get out of control. For this reason, I cannot help but believe that it would
prevail in a constitutional setting. As of right now, however, I am condent that
those terminally|ill individuals who have been able to cut through FDA's red-
tape to obtain the potentially life|saving drugs which they seek do not care that
it was an administrative agency and not the Supreme Court who made the decision
to accommodate them. With this, I would also agree.
Conclusion
As stated, the conclusion which I have reached is that what I have called
the right to stay alive is a right which should be recognized within certain
prescribed limits. I think it is correct to give terminally|ill individuals the
choice of whether or not to take potentially life-saving drugs, which have not
been approved by the FDA. However, my personal opinion on the subject is not
what is relevant, nor is it the purpose of this paper to advocate the conclusion to
which I have come. What I am arguing is simply is that the question of whether
terminally-ill individuals should have access to unapproved drugs is one that I
believe should be answered on a philosophical and ethical level.
Based on the analysis above in which I discussed the relationship between
the right to stay alive and the right(s) to die, I believe that the Supreme Court
should by its own terms be committed to honoring the former. I attempted
to illustrate this from several dierent perspectives. First, we could use the
spectrum metaphor, whereby a legal acceptance of the right to stay alive would
be justied by the legal acceptance of similar, but less innocuous, rights, e.g. the
Cruzan right. The contention would
82
83be that if the Supreme Court requires that terminally|ill individuals have the right to
refuse life|sustaining methods; if it has not conclusively ruled out physician-assisted
suicide and even encouraged debate on the topic; if one state has already legally
sanctioned assisted suicide; then it only stands to reason that we should not
interfere with a right based on the desire to try to stay alive.
Thus, we have a legal basis from which to analogize to the justication of the
right to stay alive. We have the philosophical values of freedom of choice and
personal autonomy on which to base
it. We have positive societal forces pushing for it. And we have the moral
intuition that it just seems right to give people every opportunity to try to prolong
their lives. On the basis of all this, I concluded in my rst section that the
current societal and Supreme Court views of the right to die should imply an
acceptance of the right to stay alive and a recognition of it as fundamental.
In my next section, I concluded that the right to stay alive might also be able to
withstand a substantive due process balancing test. Although I acknowledged
that the right would be susceptible to many of the objections made against the
analogous right to die, I concluded that it was distinguishable from it in that
it would be better able to withstand or dodge these objections. I also posed
some hypothetical objections against it, which would not apply to the right to
die. Though I appreciate the gravity and legitimacy of government interests
that might compete with the right to live, I believe on the whole both that the
benets would outweigh the risks and that the values which underlie the right
are ones that accord completely with our moral and societal goals. In this light,
it would be hard to come up with a government interest compelling enough to
weigh against the right.
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84I based this last conclusion on my analysis of the Clucksberg and Quill Courts' ob-
jections to allowing assisted suicide. There, I argued that the reasons which the
Court gave for being disinclined to allow the option of assisted suicide should by
implication commit it to wanting to require that terminally|ill individuals have
the option of taking potentially life|saving drugs. The idea was that precisely
the same values which the Court denounced assisted suicide as standing against
are those which allowing the right to stay alive stand for, particularly the notion
that human life should be preserved. If, as the Court seems to be implying, an
intention to live is more morally desirable than an intention to die, then allowing
dying people the right to try whatever medications they can to save their failing
lives has to be something that we should encourage, at least in theory. Thus,
not only can an acceptance of the right to stay alive be justied on the basis
of arguments made for the right to die, it can also be justied on the basis of
arguments made against it.
In many of the same respects, both the right to stay alive and the right to
die have strong philosophical and emotional appeal; equally, however, they both
oppose interests that are philosophical and emotionally appealing as well. With
respect to assisted suicide, these opposite forces leave me ultimately in a state
of ambivalence. With respect to my topic, however, though I am also pulled in
both directions, I nd myself leaning more towards advocating an acceptance
of the right than a denial of it. I suppose this is because, in case of a mistake,
assisted suicide has a graver and more irreversible downside.
My next analysis took a step back to the very premise of my paper. In
this section, I attempted to explain why I believe that, like the issue of assisted
suicide, and the Cruzan issue, the right
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85to stay alive should be formulated as a positive right and evaluated in a constitutional
setting. I discussed the pros and cons of keeping the issue within the jurisdiction of
the FDA, and mentioned how the FDA's control could technically be extended
to cover right to die issues as well. Ultimately, however, I concluded that the
FDA is not the appropriate place for issues concerning any of these rights to
be decided, precisely because I believe that rights relating to life-and-death
decisions which must be made by the terminally-ill, should comprise a special
category of rights that is subject to its own rules and standards.
True, the FDA is making some eorts to accommodate the rights of the
terminally|ill, and true a constitutional challenge might fail. However, despite
FDA's concessions, the current state of aairs for the terminally-ill in this area
remains tenuous and unsatisfactory. As I mentioned earlier, there have been
extensive lobbying eorts for big diseases such as cancer and AIDS. And while
all terminally|ill people ultimately benet by any administrative and/or leg-
islative reform that these eorts achieve, other rarer, less recognized diseases do
not have the lobbies such as this, and thus could easily get left behind.
I started this discussion by admitting that it is not as simple as saying that
people who are dying should be allowed to do whatever they can to stay alive,
since they have virtually nothing to lose. At base, however, this is not far from
the truth. I know this from my experience with my friend Harry, which induced
me to appreciate the real extent of the urgency, desperation, and helplessness
that accompanies terminal illness, especially when no really eective treatment
exists.
The last time I saw Harry, I mentioned to him a doctor who I'd heard had
treated ALS patients with what might be called an
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86alternative approach to medicine. This doctor linked ALS with diabetes and ulti-
mately pinpointed allergy as the original source of both.28 Having gone through
childhood with a host of allergies myself, I was quite familiar with the rather
strange reactions that foods and chemicals could produce. I was also familiar with
the skeptical attitudes of doctors who never thought that an issue could be that sim-
ple. After having been diagnosed and tested for all kinds of medical conditions,
I nally realized that the best doctor was my mother, who managed to cure me
of virtually all of my symptoms by changing my diet or environment.
For this reason, I was very hopeful that this doctor's alternative theory would
provide at least some help for Harry. Ironically, Harry told me that, all his life,
he had been considered a borderline diabetic. He also said that his doctor was
not opposed to alternative treatments, and encouraged whatever help he could get.
Harry took the name and phone number of the doctor and expressed a strong
interest in contacting him. Unfortunately, he weakened and died within less
than a week of my visit, and so was never able to follow through with this, or
any other type, of alternative medication.
Although I will always wonder, my feeling is that by the time of my last
visit with Harry, his disease had already progressed to a point beyond which
there was not much hope for return. However, the experience made me wish
that more information was available regarding potential treatments for terminal
diseases and that one could nd it at a kind of central location. It might be
ambitious to expect doctors to provide patients with | or even know about |
every proposed possibility for treatment pertaining to the diseases which they
treat. However, it seems quite counterintuitive, to say the least, that doctors
should be prevented from experimenting with
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87mainstream treatment possibilities, if their patients desire them to do so.
I was also glad to hear that Harry's doctor was willing to try anything to
save his life; but I was discouraged to learn later on, that there were some things
which he was prohibited from trying. The point that my experience with Harry
impressed on me is that situations involving terminal illness are truly of a type
all their own. Although I could have reasoned to that conclusion in an abstract
sense at any time, I don't think it really hit home until I saw it for myself.
Terminally|ill individuals face questions that dier in degree and type from
questions which the rest of us face. It is for this reason that I do not think it
would be arbitrary to hold them to dierent rules. After all, they are playing a
dierent game.
I spent the bulk of my paper discussing the relationship between the right
to stay alive and the right to die. What really brought these issues together
for me, however, even more than their conceptual similarities, was the central
role that both of them played in Harry's death. Harry died immediately after
exercising his Cruzan right to refuse life|support. Ironically, the same person
who was denied the option of trying to stay alive with potentially life|saving
medication was allowed to make a decision that caused his death. I am the rst
to say that my topic leaves us with many questions that need to be answered,
but I will conclude by leaving open to consideration the one which I see as most
pressing: does what happened with Harry make any sense?
We might not want to give people the right to die, but shouldn't we at least
give them the right to try to stay alive?
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